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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Disrepute of Formalism
This essay elucidates and defends legal formalism. In current academic
discussion, the avowed formalist is the missing interlocutor. Formalism is
like a heresy driven underground, whose tenets must be surmised from the
derogatory comments of its detractors. Everyone knows that legal formal-
ism asserts the distinction of law and politics. The curiosity of this distinc-
tion makes formalism seem at best a pathetic escape from the functional-
ism of law, and at worst a vicious camouflage of the realities of power.
One would not guess that formalism, properly understood and stripped of
the encrustations of hostile polemics, embodies a profound and inescapable
truth about law's inner coherence. My purpose here is to lay bare this
truth.
The most explicit criticism of formalism is to be found in the scholar-
ship of the Critical Legal Studies movement.' On the fundamental issue of
1. In his introduction to the symposium "Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies," Mark Tushnet
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whether law can in any significant sense be differentiated from politics,
however, the Critical Legal Studies denunciation of formalism is merely a
provocative statement of a commonly held academic belief. Rarely does
one find today an espousal of what the anti-formalists labor to undermine.
Most of the sophisticated writing in the United States assumes that law is
a manifestation of political purposes; dispute centers on the questions of
what those purposes should properly be and how they should be woven
into the fabric of law.2
My defense of formalism is an exploration of the sense in which law
can, after all, be differentiated from politics. This differentiation is tied
here to a complex of broader issues: How is law intelligible? In what does
the coherence of juridical relationships consist? Is a non-instrumental con-
ception of law possible? The distinction between law and politics is thus
the precipitate of an endeavor to vindicate the law's autonomy. For cur-
rent legal scholarship this autonomy is, of course, as much a delusion as
the distinction between law and politics.' My treatment of legal formal-
ism, therefore, calls contemporary assumptions into question across a wide
front.
This attempt to resurrect formalism is not merely a perverse theoretical
indulgence. Although legal scholars may deny the distinctiveness or auton-
omy of law, lawyers engaged in the practice of law have always sensed
that their intellectual world is not fully reflected in these academic conclu-
sions. Legal activity invariably takes place within some structure, however
lax. No matter how often the impossibility of such structure is announced
by academics, murmurs of disbelief are heard in the trenches below. Legal
formalism is the effort to make sense of the lawyer's perception of an
intelligible order. This is why in the last two centuries formalism has
been killed again and again, but has always refused to stay dead.
Formalism postulates that law is intelligible as an internally coherent
phenomenon. The implications of the formalist claim extend to every as-
pect of reflection about law. It affects one's view of the nature of legal
justification, the limits of the judicial role and judicial competence, the
meaning of legal mistake, the relevance of instrumentalism, the relation of
identifies the attack on all types of formalism as one of the themes at the heart of the Critical Legal
Studies approach. Tushnet, Introduction, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 239 (1984). The Critical Legal
Studies attack on liberal political theory is related to its attack on formalism, because liberal theory is
considered to depend on formalism. Tushnet views formalism as claiming "that some type of analysis
provides a solution to problems of legal choice, policy choice, or social analysis by limiting the range of
pure choice within which the analyst-judge, policy-maker, social scientist-operates." Id. at 239.
2. Even when a distinction between legal and political justification is asserted, the distinction itself
is justified in terms of a political vision. Accordingly, the Critical Legal Studies movement's trumpet-
ing of the primacy of the political over the legal secures a position that is no longer contested. See, e.g.,
R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). (Part One of which is entitled "The Political Basis
of Law"). Dworkin states that his conception of law is "deeply and thoroughly political." Id. at 146.
3. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. Rav.
761 (1987).
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law and society, the viability of contemporary legal scholarship, and the
place of law among the intellectual disciplines. The scope and importance
of these issues attest to the inescapably fundamental nature of the formal-
ist claim.
Although its rigorous separation of the juridical and the political sets
formalism apart from the main body of contemporary writing, formalism
stands most opposed to Critical Legal Studies. Yet this very opposition
also, paradoxically, brings the two together, for they do at least place the
same issue at the heart of jurisprudence. For the formalist, the law's inner
rationality reflects the possibility of its coherence, and this possibility is
what Critical Legal Studies scholarship emphatically denies. The assump-
tion common to both opposing views is that the law's moral legitimacy
hangs on the outcome of their dispute. Mainstream scholarship, in con-
trast, allows itself to see the law as a plurality of competing or
unintegrated purposes.' It implicitly concedes the point made by its radi-
cal critics but refuses to be embarrassed by it, claiming that the law's
incoherence is manageable or even productive of good.' Both formalism
and Critical Legal Studies reject this confession and avoidance, and insist
on the importance of coherence for law.'3
Formalism's theme-the internal intelligibility of law-is indispensable
to any serious effort of legal philosophy. Juristic activity includes reflec-
tion on its own self-understandings and aspirations. This internal stand-
point cannot be ignored: Only by reference to it is legal philosophy as-
sured of having made contact with its subject matter. Nothing is more
senseless than to attempt to understand law from a vantage point entirely
extrinsic to it.7 Formalism takes the internal standpoint to its extreme and
makes it decisive for the understanding of juridical relationships. It
thereby offers the most uncompromising construal of the law's inner
intelligibility.
4. For an overview of this characteristic of contemporary scholarship see Weinrib, Law as a
Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 472, 474-78 (1987).
5. See, e.g., Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,Jr.,
43 U. CH. L. REv. 69, 100-08 (1975) (discussing functional advantages of seeing causation as inter-
play of different goals).
6. This commonality makes Critical Legal Studies dependent on formalism in two ways. First, the
radical denial of legal coherence presupposes a grasp of what coherence might be and thus of what the
formalist asserts. Without such a grasp, Critical Legal Studies risks misconceiving the target and thus
firing to no effect. Second, the Critical Legal Studies practice of the immanent critique of legal doc-
trine presupposes a conception of the immanent, since one cannot properly criticize law from the
inside without understanding the nature of the law's internality. However, although Critical Legal
Studies depends on conceptions of the coherent and the immanent, no satisfactory account of these
conceptions can be found either within its literature or (at least in contemporary scholarship) outside
it. This essay, accordingly, attempts to supply the missing account of the law's immanent coherence.
7. For reliance on the law's internal point of view by philosophers of different persuasions see J.
FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 11-18 (1980); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 33-94 (1964); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 86-88 (1961); J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REA-
SON AND NORMS 170-77 (1975).
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B. What Formalism Is
My starting point is the formalism described in Roberto Unger's influ-
ential critique." Unger regards formalism as fundamental to the legal
thought that he opposes and considers to have been conclusively discred-
ited. His description is, nevertheless, a valuable statement of formalism's
principal themes and identifies the matter at issue. Indeed, in the litany of
recent criticism of formalism, Unger is almost unique in providing an un-
superficial delineation of a position worth opposing. His description com-
bines lack of sympathy with insight.
In Unger's account formalism brings together three features. First, for-
malism asserts the possibility of "a method of legal justification that can
be clearly contrasted to open-ended disputes about the basic terms of so-
cial life."' In this conception law features a mode of rationality that is
different in kind from the less determinate rationality of political and ide-
ological contest. Legal doctrine is possible only through "a restrained, rel-
atively apolitical method of analysis."' Second, the distinctive rationality
of law is immanent to the legal material on which it operates. Formalist
doctrine is characterized by the working out of the implications of law
from a standpoint internal to law. Unger accordingly defines legal analy-
sis as
a form of conceptual practice that combines . . . the willingness to
work from the institutionally defined materials of a given collective
tradition and the claim to speak authoritatively within this tradition,
to elaborate it from within in a way that is meant, at least ulti-
mately, to affect the application of state power."
Finally, formalism presupposes that the ensemble of authoritative legal
materials "display, though always imperfectly, an intelligible moral or-
der." 2 Formalism relies on some guiding vision about human association
that supplies the normative theory sanctifying the tradition as a whole and
yet allows some of the received understandings and decisions in it to be
rejected as mistaken.
Formalism can accordingly be summed up as proffering the possibility
8. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 563-76 (1983). Refer-
ence to this well-known account guarantees that my defense engages the anti-formalist contentions to
which it purports to respond. Moreover, the conception of formalism Unger presents is (as he rightly
points out, see infra note 14) presupposed in the thinking of orthodox lawyers, so that it implicitly
informs whatever assumptions are current concerning law's internal order.
9. Unger, supra note 8, at 564.
10. Id. at 565.
11. Id.
12. Id. In Unger's terminology this feature is a characteristic of objectivism rather than formal-
ism. Unger seems to distinguish between formalism and objectivism only because "[t]he modern law-
yer may wish to keep his formalism while avoiding objectivist assumptions." Id. Since Unger himself
considers (correctly in my view) such a distinction to be untenable, we may regard objectivism as an
aspect of formalism.
1988]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 949
of an "immanent moral rationality."'" Each term in this phrase corre-
sponds to one of the three features in Unger's description. The first fea-
ture, that law has a distinctive rationality, expresses the formalist concep-
tion of law negatively through a contrast with political justification. The
second, the immanent operation of legal rationality, characterizes law's
distinctiveness affirmatively through the claim that the content of law is
elaborated from within. The third asserts the moral dimension of this ra-
tionality, ascribing normative force to its application.
Unger's description gives a satisfactory preliminary sketch.' 4 All that
needs to be added is that formalism, at least as I shall present it here, is
13. Id. at 571.
14. The description reflects legal formalism both as it has been understood in the philosophic
tradition of natural law and natural right and as it is presupposed in the ideal of coherence to which
sophisticated legal systems aspire. According to the natural law tradition, law is a rational ordering
that cannot be understood apart from the good which it functions to promote. The classic account is
by St. Thomas Aquinas, in T. AQUINAS, Treatise on Law, in SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, QQ.
90-105, and in THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 3-91 (D. Bigongiari ed. 1953). For
recent expositions, see J. FiNNIS, supra note 7; H. VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS: FACTS OR FANCY
(1985). In the natural right tradition, law is the realization of the requirements of the rational will,
which is initially characterized by a capacity to abstract from particular conceptions of the good. See
G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox trans. 1952); I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd trans. 1965). These traditions postulate a version of formalism that
has implications for the law's content. This formalism is therefore distinguishable from the thinner
formalism of positivism, which contrasts the formal principle of legal validity with the material con-
tent of law and thus makes the notion of law as such indifferent to the law's content. See H. KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg trans. 1945); cf. Hegel, Prefatory Lectures on
the Philosophy of Law, 8 CLIO 49 (A. Brudner trans. 1978):
Positive jurisprudence has for its content authoritative law, all the laws that have validity in a
state, and that have validity by virtue of being posited . . . . We are here concerned, first of
all, with the form of law as the latter is an object for positive jurisprudence; the content will be
given afterwards. The form is this: the law is valid whether the content is rational and intrinsi-
cally [an undfur sich] just, or whether it is extremely irrational, unjust, completely arbitrary,
and given by the authority of external force. The bare fact of being, of having authority, says
nothing about worth.
Id. at 62. Since positivism does not construe law as "an immanent moral rationality," its version of
formalism is implicitly excluded from Unger's description, and it also falls outside the scope of this
essay.
A noteworthy feature of Unger's account of formalism is that he now expressly refuses to equate
formalism with "the search for a method of deduction from a gapless system of rules." Unger, supra
note 8, at 564. He thereby expands the characterization of formalism that appeared in his own earlier
work, see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 92 (1975), and in the work of others, see, e.g.,
Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988). Unger's account now includes the invocation of all impersonal formulations of legal content,
including principles that do not deductively yield determinate conclusions. The relation between for-
malism and indeterminacy is discussed infra Section VI.
The felicity of Unger's description undermines the only criticism he makes of formalism. Unger's
argument is one of probability. Formalism is
unlikely to prove compatible with a broad range of the received understandings. . . . [Be-
cause] [tihe many conflicts of interest and vision that law-making involves, fought out by
countless minds and wills working at cross-purposes, would have to be the vehicle of an imma-
nent moral rationality whose message could be articulated by a single cohesive theory.
Unger, supra note 8, at 571. But Unger himself immediately points out that the compatibility of
formalism and legal doctrine is "tacitly presupposed by the unreflective common sense of orthodox
lawyers." Id. If the efforts of the legal profession (and of the judges drawn from its midst) are
animated by this shared presupposition, the "countless minds and wills" that contribute to the elabo-
ration of law may not in fact be "working at cross-purposes." At least, the tacit adherence to a
common presupposition may cut down the odds of the incompatibility Unger postulates.
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an integrative notion. The rationality, immanence, and normativity that
characterize it are not disjointed attributes contingently combined, but
mutually connected aspects of a single complex. For the formalist, law is
not merely rational and immanent and normative; rather, it has each of
these qualities only because it also has the other two.15 Formalism postu-
lates not merely the compresence of the features that Unger perceptively
notices, but their mutual dependence and interrelationship in a single ap-
proach to legal understanding.
The most mysterious of the three formalist attributes is that of imma-
nence. 6 By suggesting that the rationality of law lies in a moral order
immanent to legal material, formalism postulates that juridical content can
somehow sustain itself from within. The internalist dimension of formal-
ism is at odds with current assumptions about law in several ways.
The dominant tendency today is to look upon the content of law from
the standpoint of some external ideal that the law is to enforce or make
authoritative. Implicit in contemporary scholarship is the idea that the law
embodies or should embody some goal (e.g., wealth maximization, 17 mar-
ket deterrence,' liberty,19 utility,20 solidarity21 ) that can be specified apart
from law and can serve as the standard by which law is to be assessed.
Thus law is regarded as an instrument for forwarding some independently
desirable purpose given to it from the outside.
The external relation that these scholars believe exists between law and
the content it comes to have reflects their positivist understanding of law.
In the positivist conception, a legal reality is brought into existence by an
act of will that transforms into law that which is otherwise not law.22 The
content of law as such is only the product of some law-creating act. Be-
cause the power to create law can work for good or for evil, a legal system
is not a phenomenon that in itself immanently embodies a moral rational-
ity.23 Whether any particular law is moral is a matter to be settled by an
argument outside rather than inside the law, through reference to the in-
dependent desirability of the ideals that the particular law reflects.
15. Its rationality, for instance, consists in its being immanent to the normative relationships that
it orders. Similarly, the law's normativity is a function of its success in embodying in its doctrines and
institutions the rationality inherent to them.
16. Although the significance of rationality and normativity is highly controversial, they are at
least recognizable as terms of contemporary academic discourse.
17. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
18. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
19. See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
20. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
21. See, e.g., R. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY (1984).
22. See H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 2-10 (M. Knight trans. 1967).
23. In John Austin's famous formulation: "The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit
is another." J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184 (1832). For a modem
treatment, see Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593
(1958).
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In this conception the legislative process is the distinctive vehicle of le-
gality. Through this process, something that is otherwise without legal
significance gets inscribed into the schedule of collectively approved and
authoritative aims. Legislation is the mechanism through which the legal
system imports from the outside the material that it makes its own. It is
not merely that the expressly legislative organs of governance are regarded
as paradigmatic, but that public authority generally is conceived as being
fundamentally legislative: Positivists consider even adjudication to be a
species of legislative activity. All legal norms, even those elaborated by
judges, depend on the metamorphosis into law of material that is origi-
nally non-legal.
This conception ascribes to law a primarily political nature. It is preoc-
cupied with the notions of coercion, authority, and validity and with the
identification of the external purposes that are to be transformed into legal
norms. Law is regarded as wafting down from the publicly recognized
organs of power, and legal relations are in the first instance relations be-
tween the holders of authority and the subjects of authority."'
In construing law as an immanent moral rationality, formalism directly
challenges these assumptions about law's provenance, nature, and charac-
teristic process. In the formalist conception, law has a content that is not
imported from without but elaborated from within. Law is not so much
an instrument in the service of foreign ideals as an end in itself constitut-
ing, as it were, its own ideal. Rather than being an exclusively positivist
transformation of the non-legal into the juridical, law can involve the rec-
ognition of that which already has an inchoate juridical significance. The
paradigmatic legal function is not the manufacturing of legal norms but
the understanding of what is intimated by juridical arrangements and re-
lationships. Legal creativity here is essentially cognitive, and it is most
naturally expressed in adjudication conceived more as the discovery than
as the making of law.
Legal formalism's postulation of an immanent rationality ties it to the
rationalist tradition in Western philosophy, which grappled with the
question of how something could be understood in and through itself.25 To
understand something in this way is to understand it unconditionally in
the literal sense, i.e., as something whose intelligibility is not conditioned
24. See, e.g., Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 41 (1979).
25. No doubt part of the unpopularity of legal formalism is based on the aversion of academic
lawyers in the United States to this tradition. Rationalism has the reputation of being enmeshed in an
arid conceptualism and encumbered with profitless metaphysical baggage. It is therefore regarded as
incompatible with the pragmatic nature of legal analysis. The very fact that this tradition is now so
remote should, however, make contemporary scholars leery of dismissing legal formalism as facilely as
they do. Just as they are no longer familiar with what gives formalism its strength, so they perhaps
ascribe unreal weaknesses to it. Having lost contact with the vocabulary, the philosophical literature
and the conceptual apparatus that nourished legal formalism, can they be confident that their present
rejection is based on anything more than an ignorant caricature?
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by or dependent upon anything extrinsic. The legal formalist asserts that
whatever else can or cannot be understood in this way, law at least can.
In particular, legal formalism endeavors to make the notion of form
central to the understanding of juridical relationships. This notion has a
distinguished and venerable history that stretches back from the present
century to the great thinkers of classical antiquity. Yet contemporary writ-
ing on law rarely attends to its significance. My elucidation of formalism
will attempt to make good this defect by first outlining what form is and
then tracking its implications for legal philosophy. Form is the bedrock on
which formalism rests. The general inattention to the significance of form
renders the conclusion that formalism has been discredited the merest
dogma. I wish to call this dogma into question, to expose it as such by
focusing on what it ignores, and to suggest that formalism, properly un-
derstood, is indispensable to our understanding of law.
II. THE NATURE OF FORM
Legal formalism claims that juridical relationships can be understood as
embodying, in Unger's phrase, an "immanent moral rationality." The
function of law for the formalist is to express this immanent rationality in
the doctrines, institutions, and decisions of the positive law.2" Juridical
relationships so conceived are intelligible by reference to themselves and
not solely as the translation into law of an independently desirable politi-
cal purpose.
Legal form is concerned with the understanding of juridical relation-
ships.27 Since the point of my entire exposition of formalism is to present
an affirmative conception of the juridical, I can indicate the significance of
the term at this preliminary only negatively. One example is the relation-
ship that obtains between the victim and the person who intentionally in-
flicts a blow. While this is a physical event, its juridical significance can-
not be grasped solely through the investigation of the mechanics of the
impact. Nor can its juridical significance be understood solely by reference
to the positive law of a particular jurisdiction. It is true that a sophisti-
cated system of positive law aims at an intelligible connection between the
existence and the resolution of controversy and that its holdings are there-
fore relevant to the understanding of the juridical nature of the relation-
ship. The holdings that govern this incident, however, may be mistaken
even from a legal standpoint. The positive law may provide only a defec-
tive rendering of the juridical significance of what happened."8 Similarly,
26. The positive law is immanently rational to the extent that it captures and reflects the contours
of rationality that are internal to the relationships that law governs.
27. I shall hereafter use the term "juridical" in its etymological sense to refer to that which is
declaratory of jus and which thereby represents an essentially legal mode of intelligibility.
28. This essay is about law as a mode of ordering, not as a set of posited norms. Inasmuch as law
is a mode of ordering, it has a capacity for coherence. My concern is with the nature of the coherence
19881
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a juridical relationship is not defined historically or sociologically in terms
of the development of this positive law or of the societal considerations
that sustain it. The juridical nature of a relationship refers, in a sense still
to be defined, to a paradigmatically legal mode of intelligibility that goes
beyond the physical, the positive, the historical, or the sociological.
Our first task, then, is to clarify the formalist conception of understand-
ing. What is it for something to be intelligible? And how do juridical
relationships fit into this conception of intelligibility?
A. Form and Content
The intelligibility of any matter refers to a relationship between the
matter's content and its form. When we seek the intelligibility of some-
thing, we want to know what the something is. This search for "what-
ness" presupposes that the something is a this and not a that, that it has,
in other words, a determinate content. This content is determinate because
it sets the matter apart from other matters and prevents it from falling
back into the chaos of unintelligible indeterminacy that its identification as
a something denies. The content has thus both a positive and a negative
significance: It makes the matter in question what it is, and it differenti-
ates it from what it is not.
The set of properties that renders a content determinate is, when con-
sidered in itself, the matter's form.30 Form is the ensemble of characteris-
tics that constitute the matter in question as a unity identical to that of
other matters of the same kind and distinguishable from matters of a dif-
ferent kind. Form is not separate from content but is the ensemble of
characteristics that marks the content as determinate, and therefore marks
the content as a content.
The interrelationship between form and content can be illustrated by
considering the form of a table. Those characteristics that mark the con-
tent of a table as determinate may include elevation, flatness, hardness,
applicable to juridical relationships. Although I assume that there are legal systems that value coher-
ence, see infra note 42, I make no claim about the extent to which the positive law of any jurisdiction
(or set of jurisdictions) has achieved coherence.
29. Determinacy is discussed infra Section VI-C.
30. For a contemporary treatment of form, see A. BERNDTSON, POWER, FORM, AND MIND
105-24 (1981). Form has recently been discussed from the deconstructive standpoint. See H. STATEN,
WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA 4-19 (1984). For the classic modern treatment of form as an Aristote-
lian notion, see J. OWENS, THE DOCTRINE OF BEING IN THE ARISTOTELIAN 'METAPHYSICS' 307-99
(3d ed. 1978). Twentieth-century legal philosophers who have paid attention to the significance of
form are G. DEL VECCHIO, THE FORMAL BASES OF LAW 68-80 U.. Lisle trans. 1921); M.
OAYESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 3-8 (1975) (understanding in terms of ideal character); and R.
STAMMLER, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE 167-69 (1. Husik trans. 1925). Emilio Betti has defined form
as "an homogeneous structure in which a number of perceptible elements are related to one another
and which is suitable for preserving the character of the mind that created it or that is embodied in
it." Betti, Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften, in CONTEMPO-
RARY HERMENEUTICS 54 (U. Bleicher ed. 1980). For a recent treatment of related issues, see S.
MEIKLE, ESSENTIALISM IN THE THOUGHT OF KARL MARX 153-74 (1985).
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typical function, and so on. By reference to the ensemble of the character-
istics of "tableness" that make up the form of a table, we can understand
all the embodiments of this form as being the same sort of thing and each
table as being a single thing. The ensemble of characteristics that consti-
tute its form makes this thing intelligible as a table, and it has the deter-
minate content of a table inasmuch as it is the embodiment of this intelli-
gible form.
Form and content are correlative and interpenetrating. If any content
were formless, it would lack the very determinateness which makes it pos-
sible for us to experience it as a something, and it would therefore be, so
far as we are concerned, an indeterminate something or other that is noth-
ing in particular. If a form, on the other hand, were without content, it
would not be a form of anything and therefore not a form at all. Form
therefore is content and content form, with the distinction between them
being notional, not ontological. A thing's form is not a new thing existing
separately from that of which it is the form. Rather, form discloses the
intelligibility of the thing's content, so that the form is the content qua
intelligible and, conversely, the content is the form qua determinate. We
understand something when form and content are congruent, that is, when
the ensemble of characteristics that we consider to be the form represents
what the content really is and, equivalently, when what we consider to be
the content adequately expresses the thing's form. Whatever is thought to
be in the gap between content and form (for example, a characteristic
ascribed to the content that is not a component of its form or a character-
istic considered part of the form but not present in the content) is either
error or ignorance."1
The notion of form has three interrelated aspects. First, to see the form
of something is to regard that thing as having a certain character. This
character is the ensemble of characteristics that allows us to define some-
thing as the sort of thing it is. The specification of the characteristics that
go to a thing's form is not an exhaustive recapitulation of all of a thing's
individuating attributes; that would be as unilluminating as a detailed
map drawn to actual scale that reproduced the topography it was sup-
posed to outline. Rather, the exercise demands a selection of the attributes
so decisive of the thing's character that they can truly be said to character-
ize it, and this entails a differentiation between the attributes that are
definitive of the thing and those that are merely incidental.3 2 Accordingly,
31. See G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 14, at 2 ("What we have to do with
here is philosophical science, and in such science content is essentially bound up with form."); cf. G.
HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES) § 383, at
12 (W. Wallace trans. 1971) ("[Flor form in its most concrete signification is reason as speculative
knowing, and content is reason as the substantial essence of actuality, whether ethical or natural. The
known identity of these two is the philosophic idea.").
32. The differentiation is illustrated by Aquinas:
iT]he essence or nature includes only what falls within the definition of the species; as human-
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in inquiring after form we can ask, "[Wihat elements of a conception are
for other constituents of the same conception logically determining, in the
sense that they cannot be left out of account, if one is not to lose the entire
mental representation which is directly under discussion. . .?"s Through
reference to the ensemble of characteristics that give a thing its character,
we comprehend the thing in question as what it is; in classical terminol-
ogy, we grasp its nature or essence. And conversely, if its character eludes
us, we cannot be said to have understood it at all.
Second, form is a principle of structure or unity. The thing that has a
form is a single entity, characterized by the ensemble of attributes that
make it what it is. In comprehending a thing's form, we understand the
thing neither as an aggregate of independently intelligible properties nor
as a homogeneous unit consisting of an extended single property. Rather,
the thing is a single entity comprised of the set of characteristics that de-
fines it, and it has the unity of an articulated whole that is not reducible
to-is therefore greater than-the sum of all of its parts. The component
characteristics that partake of any form are accordingly understood as mu-
tually related through the oneness of what they inform.
Third, form signifies the genericity of the thing's character. Genericity
is that which allows us to regard all the instances of the matter in ques-
tion as having the same character and as being other than whatever has a
different character. Because specifying an ensemble of characteristics in-
volves distinguishing the essential from the inessential qualities, form re-
fers not to the thing's fully individuated particularity, but to the general
class under which it falls. The set of properties that makes something a
table, for instance, is found in all tables and constitutes the genericity of
what it is to be a table. Form is thus the principle that allows a thing to
be grouped with others of the same sort.
Thus form exhibits character, unity and genericity as the three essential
aspects of intelligibility. Together the characteristics comprise the thing's
character, the grasp of which is indispensable to the understanding of
what the thing is. The character is not the aggregate of these characteris-
tics wherever any of them is located, but a set that achieves its distinctive
ity includes all that falls within the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it
is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter,
with all the individuating accidents, does not fall within the definition of the species. For this
particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., do not fall within the definition
of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities designating this partic-
ular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the reality which is a
man. Hence, the reality which is a man has something in it that humanity does not have.
Consequently, humanity and a man are not wholly identical, but humanity is taken to mean
the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined function as the
formal constituent in relation to individuating matter.
T. AQuINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIcA I., Q. 3, Art. 3, in INTRODUCTION TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 29
(A. Pegis ed. 1948).
33. Stammler, Fundamental Tendencies in Modern Jurisprudence, (pts. 1 & 2), 21 MICH. L.
Rrv. 862, 883 (1922-1923).
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unity by constituting the thing in question as a single thing classifiable
with other things of the same sort. Such characteristics are not significant
in isolation but only inasmuch as they make up the character of the whole
that they constitute: To modify an essential characteristic is to modify the
whole, and to modify the whole is to alter the significance of its constitu-
tive characteristics.
B. The Relevance of Immanent Intelligibility
The point of referring to something's form is to grasp the thing's nature
or intelligible essence, and thus to understand that thing as what it is. One
might object that this enterprise is doomed to failure, because in setting
out what purports to be a thing's form, we are not exhibiting anything
about the thing but only about ourselves. The way in which we divide and
classify the world and associate certain objects with certain qualities is a
reflection, it might be said, of the circumstances and requirements of our
own life rather than of the world on to which our conclusions are pro-
jected. Form varies according to vocabulary, linguistic practices, and par-
ticular needs and purposes: Such variability belies the permanence and
universality that is sought in the notion of form. As Locke put it, "those
Forms, which there hath been so much noise made about, are only Chi-
maera's; which give us no light into the specifick Natures of Things ...
[T]hese Boundaries of Species, are as Men, and not as Nature makes
them. .... 3
This objection alleges that the characteristics going to the form of some-
thing do not assume their significance from the internal nature of the
thing but from our external requirements as users, observers, and inquir-
ers. The inquirer approaches the object from the outside and subjects it to
the demands of his or her enterprise, while the object itself lies shapeless
and is available to whatever form the cognizing mind reads into it. For
example, the peculiarly shaped wood before us is a table because we can
make it serviceable for a function that we ascribe to it or that dominated
the mind of its manufacturer. Form thus bespeaks an intelligibility intro-
duced from the outside.
The crucial presupposition of this criticism is that a qualitative disjunc-
tion exists between the inquirer's thought and the object of the enquiry.
According to this view, the object is the target, but need not be the embod-
iment, of thought. In specifying the attributes through which it character-
izes the object, thought has no access to whatever might illuminate the
thing's intelligibility from within and therefore imposes a foreign occupa-
tion that serves its own interests.
Whatever the validity of this presupposition with regard to natural or
34. J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING book III, ch. VI, § 30 (P.
Nidditch ed. 1975).
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artifactual objects, the legal formalist denies that this is the entire truth
with respect to law. Legal formalism postulates that the law's content can
be understood in and through itself by reference to the mode of thinking
that shapes it from inside. For the formalist, law is constituted by
thought: Its content is made up of the concepts (e.g., cause, remoteness,
duty, consideration, offer and acceptance) that inform juridical relation-
ships. Law is identical to the ideas of which it is comprised, and the intel-
ligibility of law lies in grasping the order and connection of these ideas. 5
Because law is, at least in the formalist understanding, essentially concep-
tual, it does not present itself as alien to the enquirer's efforts to compre-
hend it. Thus the formalist assumption is that law is, however inchoately,
an exhibition of intelligence.3 6 For this reason our understanding can,
without sacrifice or diminution, assume the perspective that animates the
juridical enterprise from within. Accordingly, in the formalist view there
is in law an integration of the activity of understanding with the matter to
be understood. Since law is assumed to be intelligible from within, the
content of law is regarded as being homogeneous with, and therefore ac-
cessible to, thought.
By eliminating the disjunction between the understanding and the ob-
ject one is endeavoring to understand, the formalist assumption, if it can
be sustained, opens the path to the elucidation of juridical content in terms
of its underlying form. If law is constituted by thought and therefore ac-
cessible from within to the operation of our intelligence, the sting is
drawn-at least with respect to law-from Locke's observation that the
boundaries of form are as men and not as nature makes them. Inasmuch
as law's nature is to be immanently intelligible, one can grasp this nature
without distortion. Just as one can understand geometry by working
through a geometrical perplexity from the inside, so one can understand
law by an effort of mind that penetrates to, and participates in, the struc-
ture of thought that law embodies.
The elucidation of law through the notion of form is a way of exhibit-
ing the immanent intelligibility of the law's content. One might suppose
that formalism's dependence on immanent intelligibility is self-defeating:
If law is already immanently intelligible, nothing remains to be accom-
plished through the elucidation of legal form. This, however, is not so.
Although the law is capable of being understood from within, such an
understanding is not necessarily fully explicit in the legal materials.
Moreover, because sophisticated legal systems admit the possibility that a
given juridical determination may be erroneous from an internal perspec-
35. The characteristics of a juridical relationship are not predicates ascribed it by outside observ-
ers, but are the concepts (and the corresponding doctrines and institutions) that make up its interior
structure.
36. For an explication of the notion of an "exhibition of intelligence," see M. OKsHorr, supra
note 30, at 13-15.
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tive, the law's immanent intelligibility may be defectively expressed in any
given case. The task for the formalist is to make explicit the intelligibility
latent in the legal materials and thereby to indicate that from which legal
error is a deviation. Form represents the interplay of character, unity, and
genericity. Thus the formalist will attempt to discern the essential charac-
teristics of a legal relationship and to disclose how these characteristics
cohere to make this relationship irreducible and hence classifiable with
other relationships of the same sort. The function of form is to draw out
the law's immanent intelligibility by making salient the nature of unity
and coherence both within and among legal relationships.
C. Some Implications of Immanent Intelligibility
The following parts of this Article clarify how the formalist elucidation
of law proceeds and the assumption of law's immanent intelligibility is
substantiated. It is appropriate at this point, however, to signal several
general implications of this conception of intelligibility.
Immanent intelligibility is not a subclass but a paradigm of intelligibil-
ity. Its virtue is that whatever is immanently intelligible can be under-
stood self-sufficiently without recourse to something external that would
pose the problem of intelligibility afresh. If something is not intelligible in
and through itself, it must, if it is intelligible at all, be intelligible through
something else. But unless that other thing is in its turn intelligible
through itself, it will merely point to something else on which its own
understanding depends. This regression continues until the understanding
alights upon something that is immanently intelligible. Therefore, intelli-
gibility that is immanent to its subject matter is the most satisfactory no-
tion of understanding, and not merely one among many.
Moreover, something that is immanently intelligible must be under-
stood by reference to this quality. If the immanence of a thing's intelligi-
bility is disregarded in favor of an external mode of comprehension, we
simply fail to understand the most understandable aspect of the thing in
question. Just as the profoundest understanding of the Pythagorean theo-
rem comes from working through its geometric proof rather than by ex-
amining the economic conditions of Magna Graecia that may have influ-
enced Pythagoras in his day, so any immanently intelligible matter must
be grasped by reference to its immanent intelligibility.
Two consequences of conceiving law in terms of the immanent intelligi-
bility of form merit particular notice. First, the scientific explanation of
natural phenomena is not exemplary for matters that are immanently in-
telligible. The scientist is not an omnisciently pantheistic god who knows
nature from inside. Scientific explanation is based on observation com-
bined with the hypothesis that natural phenomena conform to pervasive
regularities. Since the content of science is, as Hegel put it, "not known as
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moulded from within through the thoughts which lie at the ground of
it," this understanding is categorically different from, and inferior to, an
intelligibility that has an internal dimension."'
The relationship of immanent intelligibility to scientific explanation
bears directly on a very common anti-formalist argument. Through the
notion of form the formalist draws attention to the rationality inherent in
legal relationships and thereby denies law's radical contingency. The ob-
jection points to the contention of philosophers of science that even the
supposedly objective enterprise of scientific inquiry is conducted on the
shifting sands of historical contingency, and concludes that this contin-
gency applies to law afortiori.3 9 From the formalist perspective, however,
this argument does not get off the ground. Even if the controversy about
scientific objectivity is resolved in the manner most favorable to the objec-
tor,40 formalism rejects the premise that our notion of legal understanding
must follow in the ruts of scientific explanation. For the legal formalist,
legal phenomena are assumed to differ from natural phenomena because
they are immanently understandable. Since on this assumption law is
more perspicuous than nature, it is a mistake to burden law with conclu-
sions drawn from the scientist's external-and therefore less se-
cure-mode of cognition.
The second consequence of the connection between law and the imma-
nent intelligibility of form is that legal form is inherently non-
instrumental. An instrument can be understood only by reference to the
purpose it serves. The instrument's intelligibility lies outside itself in the
end toward which the instrument is a means. Therefore, to the extent that
juridical relationships can be seen in the light of their underlying forms
and thus by reference to themselves, there is no need to grasp them instru-
mentally. For formalism, legal ordering is not the collective pursuit of a
desirable purpose. Instead, it is the specification of the norms and princi-
ples immanent to juridically intelligible relationships. Formalism repudi-
ates analysis that conceives of legal justification in terms of some goal that
37. G. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC 190 (W. Wallace trans. 1975).
38. The point can be put in Kantian terms. Jurisprudence belongs to the realm of freedom, for
which reason's principles are constitutive, whereas the principles for the interpretation of specific
natural phenomena are merely regulative. See, e.g., I. KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT 8 (J.
Meredith trans. 1952). Kant suggests that the latter are thought of by analogy to the former. Id. at
20.
39. The canonical texts for this argument in epistemology and philosophy of science are T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) and R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY
AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). For examples of the argument in legal theory, see Caudill,
Disclosing Tilt: A Partial Defence of Critical Legal Studies and a Comparative Introduction to the
Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 IOWA L. REV. 287, 305 (1987); Hutchinson & Monahan, Law,
Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36
STAN. L. REV. 199, 219-20 (1984); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE L.J. 1, 34 (1984).
40. For a recent defense of rationalism against the attacks of Kuhn and Feyerabend, see W.
NEWTON-SMITH, THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE (1981).
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is independent of the conceptual structure of the legal arrangement in
question.
The formalist separation of law from politics reflects this distinction
between immanent and instrumental understandings. Politics is differenti-
ated from law to the extent that politics is the domain of collective instru-
mentalist purposes. What Unger noted was the more determinate ration-
ality of law is the set of values which can be located within the
immanently intelligible enterprise of juridical elaboration, as contrasted
with the state's ranging at large among the possible ends to which it might
orient its efforts.
The formalist asserts the possibility of a non-instrumental understand-
ing of juridical relations. This assertion, however, contains the following
insidious implication: The mere possibility of a non-instrumental under-
standing renders instrumental understandings of the same legal material
superfluous, but not vice versa. This follows from the paradigmatic qual-
ity of immanent intelligibility. Instrumental understandings are by their
nature imperfect. They first transfer the burden of intelligibility from the
subject of the inquiry to the external end this subject serves and then, in
turn, require that end to be grasped somehow, presumably by reference to
some further external end. Unless this endless shifting of ends can be ar-
rested at a point of non-instrumental stability, the understanding is caught
in a game of musical chairs, in which it seems to know everything only
because it knows nothing.41 Perhaps the melancholy truth is that instru-
mentalism is the most that legal analysis can achieve. But the possibility
of a non-instrumental understanding, once established, reveals the inferi-
ority of the instrumentalist alternative. Therefore instrumental and non-
instrumental understandings do not have an equal footing. The latter is
independent and fundamental; the former comes into play only by default,
as a second-best. Instrumentalism cannot remain in the competition once
non-instrumentalism enters the field.
D. Summary
Form, then, is the ensemble of characteristics that determines the con-
tent as a content, as a this and not a that, and thus differentiates content
from the indeterminacy of featureless existence. By exhibiting the essential
characteristics of some matter, form allows the matter to be conceived of
41. Compare the following comments on Spinoza's rationalistic method:
[A] basic assumption of this method is that thought must find a resting place in a single first
principle, which not only serves to explain everything else, but which is perfectly intelligible in
its own right. Moreover, since a first principle cannot, by definition be explained in terms of
anything prior, it must somehow be self-explicating or self-justifying. Anything less would fail
to satisfy the demands of thought, for it would provide us with a principle of explanation that
itself stands in need of explanation, and this would obviously lead to an infinite regress and be
cause for hopeless skepticism.
H. ALLISON, BENEDIa" DE SPINOZA: AN INTRODUCTION 60-61 (rev. ed. 1987).
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as something possessing the unity of singleness and to be grouped with
other things of the same sort. Form and content are not separate. Rather,
they stand in a reciprocal relationship, with form being the intelligibility
of determinate content and content being the realization of intelligible
form. No extrinsic standpoint is brought to bear upon this relationship
between form and content. Form signifies the immanence of intelligibility
to that which is being understood. If this approach can be sustained for
law, the intelligibility it yields will be one which is internal to juridical
relations: These relations will be understood by reference to themselves,
and not by reference to something else. An instrumental understanding, in
contrast, posits a dependence of the instrument on an end that is beyond
it. The extent to which juridical relations can be understood in terms of
themselves, therefore, is also the extent to which the political understand-
ing of law-as a means to some ulterior end-is excluded.
III. MOVING FROM CONTENT TOWARD FORM
A. The Two-Stage Movement
To understand law as the manifestation of form is to discern an inter-
nal dimension of intelligibility in law's content. The shape of this intelligi-
bility emerges in two stages. One must first discern the essential charac-
teristics of juridical relationships in a sophisticated legal system. Because
the sophistication of such a system consists in its tendency toward coher-
ence,42 one can then inquire into the extent to which these initially-
identified characteristics can be understood as a unified set. In this way,
an appreciation of the nature of coherence for juridical relationships arises
out of reflection on the content of law. Because form is the intelligibility of
a determinate content, the traces of juridical form should be visible in and
through the most significant features of the law's content. In this section I
wish to outline this movement from content toward form.
1. Identifying Essential Characteristics
In the first stage we distill from the law's content the features that
might plausibly be considered the essential characteristics of juridical in-
42. In this essay, I often refer to a "sophisticated legal system," by which I mean a legal system
that values coherence and, accordingly, has a tendency toward it. I assume that most readers of this
essay will know of such systems from their own study or experience. In my opinion, the "great" legal
systems (e.g., the common law, Roman law and its civil law offspring, Talmudic law) are sophisti-
cated in this sense. Reference to a sophisticated legal system is a way of making available insight
drawn from the legal doctrines, concepts, and institutions with which we are familiar. Not every
phenomenon that satisfies the positivist criteria of a legal system, see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAw 77-96 (1961), is sophisticated in my sense, nor has every (or any) sophisticated legal
system achieved the coherence toward which it tends. My concern here is with the nature of coher-
ence, not with the mechanics through which the valuing of coherence is manifested or the tendency
toward it is operative.
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telligibility. 43 These features will be those that are so central that they
must be understood if there is to be any understanding at all of the legal
phenomena in question. At this stage these features seem to emerge spon-
taneously as Archimedean points in legal consciousness; even in the ab-
sence of a theoretical account of their ground or interrelation, their cen-
trality is provisionally certified because any intuitively plausible discussion
of law either invokes them or presupposes them. At the level of theory,
these are the features which must be explained or explained away: Any
exposition that ignores them or does them violence runs the risk of being
regarded as contrived or artificial or somehow amiss. And at the level of
practice, legal discourse will incorporate or presuppose these features and
will explicitly or implicitly recognize them as inescapably basic to the con-
tinuing elaboration of legal doctrine.
Consider, for example, an action for negligence. One thinks through a
problem in negligence not only by reference to the corpus of specific hold-
ings directed toward very specific questions (for example, whether there is
liability for nervous shock44 or whether the landlord is under a duty to
protect tenants against criminals 45), but by seeing these holdings as repre-
senting broader legal concepts (for instance, duty, cause, and fault). These
concepts, in turn, eddy out into more fundamental and comprehensive no-
tions. Causation, for instance, applies only in a situation of misfeasance
and not non-feasance. This presupposes the distinction between the duty
to abstain from inflicting harm and the freedom to withhold a benefit, and
this distinction, in turn, points to a wide correlativity of plaintiff's right
and defendant's duty. These features of legal doctrine figure in a litiga-
tional format that grants standing to two parties who appear before a
disinterested and impartial adjudicator and that culminates, if the plaintiff
is successful, in the transfer of a sum from one party to the other.
These doctrinal, conceptual, and institutional features, and others like
them, are fixed points of tort law. When we refer to tort law, such fea-
tures characterize the object of our attention. These features form the stuff
of lawyers' talk. Their relevance is not due merely to the statistical regu-
larity of their appearance or invocation in the ever-expanding corpus of
legal materials. Rather, this regularity is itself a consequence of our fun-
neling our thinking through them as we engage in the enterprise of under-
standing and elaborating the law.
The apparent centrality of these features does not mean that they es-
cape controversy. Court decisions or legal scholarship may call any of
43. For an outstanding example of this kind of distillation, see H. HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
44. See, e.g., McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1983] 2 App. Cas. 410 (H.L.) (damages recoverable for
nervous shock).
45. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(landlord has duty to protect tenants against criminals when landlord had notice).
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them into question. For instance, a court can disregard the convention of
retroactive judgment by restricting its holding to its prospective effect,48 or
the economic analysis of tort law can, through its use of Coase's theo-
rem,4 7 ignore the distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance, or the
scholarship of Critical Legal Studies can attempt to extirpate root and
branch the sense of significance that attaches to all of these features.
These developments, however, often attest to the felt significance of these
characteristics of law. Doctrinal innovations, such as prospective overrul-
ing, are reserved for special occasions and require special justifications.
And the eclat of economic analysis or Critical Legal Studies can be ex-
plained by the exhilaration they produce precisely because they float free
of the moorings generally accepted for legal understanding.
These challenges gain their plausibility from the fact that the initial
singling out of the essential features of juridical intelligibility is at an in-
tuitive level.48 In the absence of an account of the significance of these
features, their centrality can be denied by the mere assertion of a different
intuition. Taken by itself, the process sketched so far is exposed to the
charge that the inarticulate legal experience on which it rests camouflages
an ideological or subjective selection for which no valid criteria exist.
2. The Coherence of the Characteristics
Identifying elements of the content of a sophisticated legal system as
apparently fixed points of intelligibility, however, is only the first step
toward understanding law. Confirming that these elements are truly es-
sential depends on the answer to a further question: Do they constitute a
coherent ensemble? If these elements are unconnected or pull in different
directions, the initial illumination that they offer would, for the formalist,
be fraudulent. The formalist assumes that a juridically intelligible rela-
tionship cannot consist in an aggregate of conceptually disjunct or incon-
sistent elements that, like a pile of pebbles, happen to be juxtaposed. If an
initially identified feature is to serve as a fixed point of legal understand-
ing, it must participate in the unity that renders a legal relationship intel-
ligible as what it is. It must, in short, signify an underlying form.
46. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975) (adoption of comparative negligence rule made prospective).
47. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
48. Often, those who wish to defend the centrality of these features can do no more than baldly
reiterate that what has been impugned is deeply embedded in our comprehension of the situation at
hand. For example, Richard Epstein attempts to stave off the implications of the Coase theorem by
(1) pointing to the transitive verbs used by Coase himself, and (2) distinguishing between causal
reciprocity and the notion of redress for harm caused. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 164-65. Epstein
does not explain (1) why linguistic structure overbears economic insight, or (2) how Coase can be
refuted by rehashing the very distinction that Coase's analysis challenges. Epstein's assertion that a
normative theory of torts must take into account common sense notions of individual responsibility is a




As we have seen, form is a principle of structure. To the extent that the
law governing a relationship is more than a succession of ad hoc resolu-
tions of particular controversies, the law's doctrines and institutions will
bear some imprint of form. Through this form the features that character-
ize the relationship can be understood as making up a unified whole. Be-
cause for the formalist a relationship is intelligible only insofar as its fea-
tures are coherent, their coherence is a way of determining whether the
features initially identified truly have the significance that legal experience
ascribes to them.
Many components of negligence law, for instance, seem to exemplify a
single theme, that the relationship between tortfeasor and victim is bipo-
lar. Factual causation does this by connecting the tortfeasor and the victim
through the transitivity of cause and effect. The issues of duty and prox-
imity are similarly bipolar: Through them the riskiness of the defendant's
act is viewed from the standpoint of its reasonably foreseeable effects on
the plaintiff. The adjudicative framework of tort law institutionally
matches the bipolar nature of negligence doctrine. The award of damages
is the remedial expression of bipolarity. This convergence suggests that
bipolarity is the key to the coherence of negligence law. The formalist
attempts to see whether these doctrinal and institutional elements can in-
deed be understood as the articulations of a coherent justificatory structure
of bipolar interaction. If they can, the centrality of the bipolar characteris-
tics that were initially identified as essential is confirmed. At its most in-
clusive, such a coherent justificatory structure is the form that renders in-
telligible the relationships to which it applies. Conversely, any feature
incapable of integration into a coherent structure cannot be truly constitu-
tive of the intelligibility of a juridical relationship.
For the formalist, a juridical relationship is a conceptual organism, in
which each component is meaningful as part of a whole. The functioning
of any constituent of this unity can be fully understood only in the light of
the functioning of all the others. If, for example, fault and causation are
as essential as tort doctrine assumes, each will compliment the other, and
the relationship of tortfeasor and victim will be unintelligible without
both."9 A conception of tort liability in which the plaintiff can recover
from the defendant for injury in the absence of wrongdoing, or in which
the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for a wrong that does not material-
ize in injury, would be a "conceptual monstrosity" produced by the hack-
ing apart of aspects that for this relationship have-so it is as-
sumed-significance only in combination.5 0 These essential doctrinal
49. For a detailed account, see Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
407 (1987).
50. Michael Oakeshott distinguishes two meanings of conceivability. The first refers to what can,
as a merely psychological matter, be pictured or brought together in the mind. The second relates to
what can be maintained as a coherent unity. A conceptual monstrosity is something that is conceivable
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aspects and the adjudicative framework in which they are elaborated must
be similarly integrated. The tort relationship is thus constituted by an
ensemble of conceptual and institutional characteristics. If the intelligibil-
ity of a tort relationship could withstand the omission or amputation of
any aspect of this ensemble, that very fact would show that the initial
inclusion of that aspect among the relationship's essential characteristics
was mistaken. Conversely, the reciprocal interconnection of all the truly
essential aspects of a tort relation would mean that the omission of one of
them would undermine the intelligibility of all the others.
B. Justificatory Coherence
The unity revealed by the notion of legal form represents, accordingly,
an extremely ambitious conception of coherence. A legal form is a single
justificatory structure that embraces the conceptual and institutional as-
pects essential to the understanding of a juridical relationship. Although
this structure can be articulated into parts, these parts have no vitality
independent of the structure that unifies them. It is, of course, possible to
examine one part without explicitly referring to another, as tort casebooks
and treatises do when they examine seriatim the various ingredients of the
negligence action. If these ingredients are truly essential to the intelligibil-
ity of negligence law by being aspects of its form, however, all of them
implicitly remain present when the spotlight is directed onto one. Because
they are cognizable only through the unity that they comprise, the intelli-
gibility of each simultaneously conditions, and is conditioned by, the intel-
ligibility of all the others.
The formalist conception of coherence can be illustrated by considera-
tion of the loss-spreading justification for tort liability. Under this justifi-
cation, a court regards liability as a mechanism for distributing the acci-
dent loss among the largest number of persons. It has long been
recognized that the principle of the diminishing marginal utility of money
on which this justification rests should lead to social insurance of accident
losses and, more generally, to a redistribution of wealth through progres-
sive taxation.51 Nevertheless, loss-spreading has been defended as consis-
tent with the general ideology tort law on two grounds: First, the judicial
enforcement of loss-spreading preserves the decentralized decision-making
that is traditional to tort law, and, second, loss-spreading does not aim at
a new pattern of wealth, but at re-establishing the distribution that was
disturbed by the perpetration of an injury.5
For the formalist these defenses are unsatisfactory because of their inco-
in the first but not in the second of Oakeshott's two senses. See M. OAKESHOTr, EXPERIENCE AND
ITS MODES 35-36 (1933).
51. G. CALABRESI, supra note 18, at 39-45.
52. See H. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS 76-78 (1987). A
specific example of loss-spreading is discussed infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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herent joinder of the doctrinal and the institutional. They turn on using
the adjudicative format of tort law to restrict the reach of the justificatory
force of the principle that animates loss-spreading. Because loss-spreading
is triggered by the plaintiff's suit against the defendant, it can be man-
dated only in a sporadic and decentralized way. Since a successful tort
action undoes only the effects of an injury caused by another, the distribu-
tional impetus of loss-spreading is controlled by the impossibility of hold-
ing the defendant liable for the injuries he or she has not caused. Nothing
about loss-spreading as a principle, however, is coterminous with the
scope or occasion provided by tort law. The idea that money should be
exacted from some for the benefit of others in order to spread the burden
of a catastrophic loss as lightly and as widely as possible is as pertinent to
a non-tortious, as to a tortious, injury. The levies loss-spreading justifies
are not confined to tortfeasors. Accordingly, the appropriate institutional
setting for loss-spreading is not the bipolarity of litigation, but a general
scheme of social insurance or taxation that would spread accidental loss as
thinly and broadly as possible. The restrictions arising out of the adjudi-
cative format do not, therefore, correspond to any feature internal to the
idea of loss-spreading. Rather, they are imposed on this idea from outside
it, so that it is not operationalized to the full extent of its normative reach.
Adjudication and the principle underlying loss-spreading are not part of
each other's justificatory structure. The incoherence of their combination
demonstrates that they are not aspects of the same legal form. To attempt
loss-spreading through tort adjudication is to fail to give full faith and
credit to the justificatory dimension of either loss-spreading or adjudica-
tion, the former because it is channelled into an institutional framework
that does not give effect to its normative force, the latter because it is
placed in the service of an ideal that exceeds its competence. Each is com-
promised by its artificial juxtaposition with the other.
Formalism insists on the integrity of law's justification. It arranges the
various doctrinal and institutional considerations into internally coherent
justificatory structures, so that the components of any single such structure
partake of whatever normative force gives life to the structure in its en-
tirety. Since all the aspects of any justificatory structure comprise a single
whole whose parts are interdependent, the structure's normative force is
as present in one part as it is in any other. Justification, therefore, cannot
properly be truncated. It must be allowed to expand completely into the
space that it naturally fills.
1988]
The Yale Law Journal
C. Implications and Objections
Coherence is the criterion of truth for the formalist understanding of a
juridical relationship.53 As the loss-spreading example demonstrated, the
coherence of an ensemble of justificatory aspects can confirm or negate the
essentiality of a given legal feature. The formalist elucidation of legal phe-
nomena is devoted to making explicit the unity possible in juridical rela-
tionships, and the disclosure of this unity is the yardstick of its success.
The point is not that the positive law of a given jurisdiction necessarily
embodies justificatory coherence, but that such coherence is possible, and
that positive law is intelligible to the extent that it is achieved and defec-
tive to the extent that it is not.
Coherence is inherently expansive: It resists compartmentalization and
seeks to encompass as much as possible. The illumination that formalism
yields is proportional to the possible unity that its analysis can disclose.
Just as formalism resists treating every tortious incident as a particular
that is conceptually unconnected with the understanding of any other tor-
tious incident, so it resists considering tort law, taken in its entirety, to be
conceptually unconnected to other branches of law. Formalism thus seeks
to confirm the possibility that tort law, for example, is not only coherent
on its own, but that the underlying contours of this coherence can be
found throughout private law (and perhaps beyond). In this way, private
law as a whole might be understood as a massive expression of legal form.
Accordingly, the unity of form is operative among-as well as
within-juridical relationships. Or rather, to put it more accurately, the
most inclusive conception of the unity of a relationship is also the most
general conception of the justificatory structure that the relationship ex-
emplifies. Unity and genericity are thus mutually intertwined in the co-
herence of the features that make up the legal form. The greater the reach
of that coherence, the more profound the understanding of the juridical
relationship.
The reason coherence functions as the criterion of truth is that legal
form is concerned with immanent intelligibility. Such an intelligibility
cannot be validated by anything outside itself, for then it would no longer
be immanenL. Formalism thus denies that juridical coherence can properly
53. Compare Kant's comments on the regulative employment of the ideas of reason:
If we consider in its whole range the knowledge obtained for us by the understanding, we find
that what is peculiarly distinctive of reason in its attitude to this body of knowledge, is that it
prescribes and seeks to achieve its systematization, that is, to exhibit the connection of its parts
in conformity with a single principle. This unity of reason always presupposes an idea,
namely, that of the form of a whole of knowledge-a whole which is prior to the determinate
knowledge of the parts and which contains the conditions that determine a priori for every
part its position and relation to the other parts . . . . The hypothetical employment of reason
has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of understanding, and this
unity is the criterion of the truth of its rules.
I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 534-35 (N. Smith trans. 1929) (emphasis in original).
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be compromised for the sake of some extrinsic end, however desirable.
The sole criterion is an internal one. Form is the principle of the unity
immanent to an ensemble of legal features, and judgment about intelligi-
bility can flow only from this unity. Because the intelligibility of form is
immanent to its content, no other criterion is available; and if immanent
intelligibility is (as claimed in Part II of this essay) the most satisfactory
mode of understanding, no other is needed.
Not only can no point outside the form vindicate the truth of formalism,
but no point or points, atomistically viewed, located inside the form can do
so either. Because form constitutes the unity of a set of legal phenomena,
no single element has a significance that is independent of its interplay
with the others. Therefore, it is not the presence or absence of this or that
desirable feature that is decisive for judgment about a juridical relation-
ship, but the extent to which all of its features cohere.
Thus, to return to our illustration, the adverse judgment that formalism
passes on the loss-spreading justification in tort law is not due to an antip-
athy to loss-spreading considered on its own. Loss-spreading in this con-
text is shunned for the company that it keeps, not for what it is. The
objection is to the linkage of loss-spreading and adjudication, and to the
consequent failure of this doctrinal and institutional conglomerate to ex-
press a coherent justificatory structure. If loss-spreading appeared in con-
junction with the other elements of its own form, the demands of formal-
ism would be fully met. The formalist is not, therefore, a libertarian who,
by opposing loss-spreading through tort law, stands against the use of
state machinery to transfer wealth from those who have it to those whose
need for it is more pressing. Nor is the formalist's insistence on the possi-
bility of a coherent tort law an argument that tort law should be preferred
to a general social insurance scheme that embodies loss-spreading or any
other compensatory principle. What is paramount to the formalist is not
the desirability of loss-spreading as a substantive policy, but the coherence
with which it is integrated into a justificatory ensemble.
The same considerations that make coherence formalism's criterion of
truth also allow formalism to float clear of politics. The formalist's con-
cern is not with whether a given exercise of state power is desirable, either
in its own terms or in terms of the larger ends that it serves, but with
whether it is intelligible as part of a coherent structure of justification.
Formalism abstracts from any substantive goal to the coherent ensemble of
features into which that goal might adequately fit. In decrying the tension
in our example between loss-spreading and the adjudication of tort claims,
the formalist stakes out no position about the merits either of loss-
spreading or of adjudication as techniques for dealing with accidents. Al-
though the formalist might have political opinions, he is, qua formalist,
interested solely in whether the components of any legal relationship ex-
press an integrated justificatory structure. Without disputing the legiti-
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macy of politics, the formalist insists that the product of politics live up to
the conception of justificatory coherence that is immanent to it.
The postulate that juridical relationships bear the stamp of an imma-
nently unifying form allows the internal understanding of law to progress
beyond the unsupported assertion of the intuitively central features upon
which it initially seizes. Because the notion of form provides an internal
standpoint of intelligibility, the features for which juristic experience
claims an immediate internal significance may implicitly be articulations
of the relevant form. Once the form is itself made explicit, the features
originally identified can be scrutinized to determine their adequacy as ar-
ticulations of this form. The selection of these features can now be seen as
the first stage in the search for the form of the legal arrangements in
which they figure. Inasmuch as these features are elements in an internal
understanding, form is implicit in them. The dynamic of internal intelligi-
bility can be carried through from the initial identification of these fea-
tures to the explicitness of form, which can in turn serve as a touchstone
for the initial identification. The movement is a circle of thought that
feeds upon its own unfolding explicitness: from the content of law to the
immediate juristic understanding of this content, to the form implicit in
this understanding, to the explicit elucidation of the form, to the testing of
the content for its adequacy to the now explicit form.
Intelligibility involves the interpenetration of content and its immanent
form. One achieves a complete understanding when the form is exhibited
and the content is seen as adequate to it. If the elements initially identified
have the truly fundamental significance that legal experience claims for
them, they will be constituents in the distinctive unity that makes the ju-
ridical relationship what it is. The immediate understanding of legal ex-
perience is only provisional until form becomes explicit. Then juridical
intelligibility emerges from a mutually reinforcing movement between
form and content: Form is the organizing idea latent in the content of a
sophisticated legal culture, and the ultimate test for legal content is its
adequacy to the form it expresses. In this movement the understanding of
law is completely internal to what it understands.
Now it might be objected that legal philosophy thus conceived is both
circular and apologetic: Inasmuch as its account of law does not strive for
any standpoint beyond law, the most that it can do is plough over the
same ground in ever deeper furrows, with the implication that the law as
given is suffused with positive value. But of these two criticisms, circular-
ity and apology, the first is true but not a vice, and the second is not true.
Circularity is a consequence of the self-contained nature of intelligibil-
ity. Because form is the distinct principle of unity that renders intelligible
the content that realizes it, no criterion of understanding can exist outside
form's encompassing embrace. Provided that the circle is inclusive enough,
circularity is here, as elsewhere in philosophical explanation, a strength
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and not a weakness. 54 For if the matter at hand were to be non-circularly
explained by some point outside it, the matter's intelligibility would hang
on something that was not itself intelligible until it was, in its turn, inte-
grated into a wider unity. Criticism on the grounds of circularity implies
the superiority of the defective mode of explanation that leaves outside the
range of intelligibility the very starting point upon which the whole enter-
prise depends. 55
As for the objection that an account in terms of form is inherently apol-
ogetic, this misses the radically critical lever that an internal understand-
ing makes available. The sophisticated legal system is taken as the focus of
attention because such a system makes an implicit claim to an inner ra-
tionality that bears on the formalist's interest in what such a claim might
amount to. Holding the legal content to its immanent form allows an as-
sessment, in its own terms, of the legal system's congratulatory self-
understanding. The determinations of the legal system can be adjudged
confused or mistaken to the extent that they are inadequate expressions of
the underlying form. Thus arises a standpoint for criticism that is decisive
precisely because it is internal. Whereas criticism from the outside can be
sloughed off with the argument that the critic's favored position is simply
irrelevant to the law's immanent rationality, criticism from the inside en-
gages law ineluctably on its home ground.5"
54. Recall Parmenides' claim at the dawn of philosophy that his thinking had penetrated to the
"untrembling heart of well-circled truth." H. DIELs & W. KRANZ, DIE FRAGMENTE DER VOR-
SOKRATIKER, Parmenides, fragment 1, line 29 (5th ed. 1952) (translated by author). Similarly, Hegel
writes:
Philosophy forms a circle. It has a beginning, an immediate factor (for it must somehow make
a start), something unproved which is not a result. But the terminus a quo of philosophy is
simply relative, since it must appear in another terminus as a terminus ad quem. Philosophy is
a sequence which does not hang in the air; it is not something which begins from nothing at
all; on the contrary, it circles back into itself.
G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 14, at 225; see also G. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC,
supra note 37, at 23. For instances of professed circularity in contemporary philosophy, see H.
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 235-45 (1975) (discussing hermeneutic circle); N. GOODMAN,
FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST 64 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing "virtuous circle").
55. For a conspicuous example of an ungrounded starting point, see J. BENTHAM, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 6 (London 1823) (renouncing the need
to prove the principle of utility because "that which is used to prove every thing else, cannot itself be
proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere").
56. Compare Hegel's comments on refutation:
[T]he refutation must not come from outside, that is, it must not proceed from assumptions
lying outside the system in question and inconsistent with it. The system need only refuse to
recognize those assumptions. . . . The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent's
stronghold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained by attacking him some-
where else and defeating him where he is not.
G. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC 580-81 (A. Miller trans. 1969).
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IV. THE FORMS OF JUSTICE
A. The Quest for Comprehensiveness
Let us now look more closely at the notion of legal form. The previous
section traced the movement of thought that works toward the idea of
form from reflection on the law's content. There it was pointed out that
coherence is the formalist's criterion of truth, and that the more encom-
passing the coherence the greater the illumination. A juridical relation-
ship's most inclusive unity is, therefore, also the most generalized justifica-
tory structure that the relationship instantiates. These generalized
justificatory structures, which are the most adequate conceptions of legal
form, are the focus of this section.
In this context, inclusiveness is achieved not by adding another item to
an aggregation, but by subsuming the item under a higher level of ab-
straction. Form is a unity, all the component characteristics of which com-
prise an ensemble whose intelligibility is greater than that of the sum of
its parts. The components of a legal form thus collectively express a single
idea. A form is. accordingly not a manifold that can incorporate new ele-
ments without their being integrated into its organizing unity. If a form is
to encompass the widest possible variety of juridical relationships, these
relationships cannot be pluralistically tacked on to one another, but must
exemplify the unifying idea of the form to which they belong. This re-
quires abstracting to clarify the common structure that various relation-
ships instantiate through their participation in a single form.
In its quest for the most comprehensive unities, formalism gives ex-
treme expression to the tendency to abstraction that marks legal thinking.
Although the events that give rise to a juridical relationship are particu-
lar-John Doe did such and such to Richard Roe-these events are un-
derstood by the lawyer in terms of categories (such as tort law's notions of
cause, duty of care, and fault) that abstract from the particularity of the
occurrence. Particulars are legally relevant only inasmuch as they can be
brought within juridical categories. Accordingly, a datum is legally signifi-
cant not as a particular added to an aggregate of particulars, but as the
instantiation of a category that can coherently combine with other legal
categories. Now just as legal thinking sees the particularities within its
ken as the embodiments of abstractions, so legal formalism abstracts fur-
ther from these abstractions in its quest for the most abstract conceptions
of juridical relationships. These conceptions will be the barest and most
inclusive representations of the unities that can characterize juridical rela-
tionships, and the law's content will be intelligible only to the extent that
it conforms to one of these most abstract forms.
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B. The Two Forms
The task of formulating the most inclusive juridical abstractions is not a
new one. The first description of these abstractions can be found in Aris-
totle's discussion of justice.17 Aristotle observed that juridical relationships
are paradigmatically those that obtain between parties regarded as exter-
nal to each other, each with separate interests of mine and thine.58 Aris-
totle's decisive contribution was to notice the conceptual patterns that in-
here in juridical relationships. Substantive legal rules are intelligible to
the extent that they embody the rationality exhibited by these patterns. In
Aristotle's terminology, these patterns are the forms of justice.5 1
The value of Aristotle's account is that he definitively identified the
forms that are most consistent with the process I have sketched so far.
Aristotle achieved this through reflection on the law of his own day. 0 So
inclusive and abstract are the forms he set out, however, that his conclu-
sions apply to any legal ordering of external interaction. Aristotle provides
the most formal account possible of the structures that could be latent in
external dealings among persons. Since these abstractions are immanent in
(and therefore not severable from) the content of law, they could not be
discovered except through reflection on particular legal systems. But once
elucidated, their very abstractness makes them the ultimate categories for
the coherence of juridical relationships generally. Not only are these forms
immanent in any sophisticated legal system, but the adequacy of the law's
content to these immanent forms is the measure of that system's
sophistication.
Aristotle observed that what we would now call private law has a spe-
57. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 115-23 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962). For a discussion
of this text, see Weinrib, Aristotle's Forms of Justice, 1 RATIO JURIS (forthcoming 1988).
58. By external dealings, external interaction, and external relations in this paragraph and here-
inafter, I do not mean to point merely to a locus of physical impact outside the actor, but to a subject
matter that is understood under the aspect of the parties' mutual externality, as when the separateness
of their interests is conceived as the defining feature of their relationship. Thus, although in a loving
relationship one person impacts externally on the other, it would not be a loving relationship unless
each person identified the other's good with his or her own; such a relationship is not intelligible
under the aspect of the lovers' mutual externality and is accordingly not external in the sense relevant
here. Similarly, although virtuous actions affect others, the intelligibility of virtue lies in the character
of the actor, not in the mutual externality of the actor and the party affected. As Aquinas put it:
The virtues and vices. . . are concerned with the passions, for there we consider in what way
a man may be internally influenced by reason of the passions; but we do not consider what is
externally done, except as something secondary, inasmuch as external operations originate
from internal passions. However, in treating justice and injustice we direct our principal atten-
tion to what a man does externally; how he is influenced internally we consider only as a by-
product, namely, according as he is helped or hindered in the [external] operation.
1 T. AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE Nicomachean Ethics 384 (C. Litzinger trans. 1964). Thus
virtue and justice can be "the same in substance but different in concept." Id. at 391 (commenting on
ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 114-15). I neither claim nor imply that the external relationships are
in any way superior to love or virtue. My focus throughout is on the intelligibility of external rela-
tionships, not on their desirability as compared to other kinds of relationship.
59. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 117-20.
60. See Lee, The Legal Background of Two Passages in the Nicomachean Ethics, 31 CLASSICAL
Q. 129 (1937).
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cial structure of its own. Justice is effected by an award of damages and
the consequent transfer of a certain amount of money from one party to
another.61 An award of damages simultaneously quantifies the wrong suf-
fered by plaintiff and the wrongfulness inflicted by the defendant. It thus
expresses the integration of action and injury in the wrong that one liti-
gant has done to the other. This wrong, and the damage award that un-
does it, represents a single nexus of activity and passivity where actor and
victim are defined in relation to each other.
This special structure is the most abstract mode of coherence for the
bipolar relationships of private law. It captures the correlativity within a
single transaction, of wrongful doing and suffering-and with it the corre-
lativity in private law of the defendant's duty to avoid inflicting such suf-
fering and the plaintiff's right to immunity from it. All the bilateral as-
pects of private law, from the adjudicative format of the plaintiff-
defendant lawsuit to the doctrines that link doer and sufferer, are encom-
passed by this structure. The doctrine of factual causation, for instance, is
an expression of the relation of one party to another through their doing
and suffering of the same harm. In the same vein, no tort liability arises
in a situation of nonfeasance, because the failure of one party to extend a
benefit to another is categorically different from a harm done and suf-
fered. Moreover, the treatment of the doing and suffering as a single unit
underlies the requirement that the plaintiff's injury be within the ambit of
the risk that the defendant's act wrongfully creates.62 Similarly, the con-
tract doctrines defining the formation and consequences of exchange (e.g.,
consideration, offer and acceptance, and expectation damages) embrace
both parties.63 The bilateral nature of the contractual relationship means
that the promised performance is not largess unilaterally proffered and
unilaterally revocable, but rather the content of an entitlement. Accord-
ingly, the promisor's breach is the doing of a harm to (and, correlatively,
the suffering of a harm by) the promisee.
This two-party structure underlies not only relationships that exemplify
the doing and suffering of a single harm, such as those of contract and tort
law, but also relationships whose intelligibility presupposes the special
significance of doing and suffering. Form signals the conceptual coherence
of legal doctrine and institutions, and its inclusiveness refers to all the
legal relationships that must be understood in its light. Because the inclu-
61. Aristotle is particulary interested in the structure of the relationship for which the award of
damages (or the equivalent specific relief) is a rational response to the commission of the wrong. Since
what matters is the conceptual structure of the relationship between the actor and the victim, his
analysis does not require that a wrong actually have taken place or that damages actually have been
awarded. His remarks are therefore as applicable to an injunction that prospectively restrains a wrong
as to damages that retrospectively repair a wrong.
62. See Weinrib, supra note 49, at 429-32, 438-44.
63. A detailed formalist exposition of contract doctrine is contained in Benson, The Executory
Contract in Natural Law (1986) (unpublished paper on file with author).
[Vol. 97: 949
Legal Formalism
siveness of form is for the formalist a conceptual matter, the implications
of the special nature of doing and suffering can render intelligible rela-
tionships that might not themselves be regarded as relationships of doing
and suffering. Consider, for example, the law of restitution. One can
hardly say that the recipient of a mistaken payment, who is under a legal
obligation to disgorge the benefit," has done the payor a harm. The activ-
ity was on the side of the plaintiff who made the payment; the defendant
was merely the passive beneficiary of the plaintiff's error. Nevertheless,
the intelligibility of their relationship and of the defendant's obligation to
return the unjust enrichment is conceptually dependent on the significance
of doing and suffering. Since under this form one must avoid inflicting an
unjust harm, there is no legal obligation to confer a gratuitous benefit.
Therefore, for benefits to have a legal standing, their conferral must con-
form to specific conditions concerning the transferor's intent and the
mechanics of transfer. In the common law these conditions are laid down
in the law of gifts, trusts, and seals. Other unilateral transfers, including
payments made under mistake, are invalid. Thus, the relationship conse-
quent on a mistaken payment presupposes the special juridical signifi-
cance of doing and suffering. In other words, the form instantiated in con-
tract and tort law allows us to think of the payee's retention of a mistaken
payment as a harm inflicted on the payor. 5
The second structure underlying law is one in which parties are re-
lated, not as doer and sufferer, but as persons subject to a common benefit
or burden. In this relationship, the law's task is to divide the benefit or
the burden according to some criterion. The interaction between the par-
ties is defined not in terms of what one person has done to another but in
terms of the common nature of the benefit or the burden, and the conse-
quent entitlement or liability under the criterion that distributes it.
These two understandings of interaction Aristotle called corrective jus-
tice and distributive justice. They correspond to the two ways of conceiv-
ing of the external relations upon which law fastens. For Aristotle, these
two kinds of justice were not particular substantive ideals. 8 Rather, they
were the most general conceptual patterns to which any substantive ideal
of legal ordering would have to conform if it was to have inner coherence.
In corrective justice the relationship between the parties is that of the im-
mediacy of doing and suffering in a transaction, whether that transaction
64. Kelly v. Solari, 152 Eng. Rep. 24 (Ex. Oh. 1841).
65. On the relationship between corrective justice and criminal law, see infra note 73.
66. These are substantive ideals in today's non-formalistic discourse, where Aristotle's terminol-
ogy survives divorced from the mode of thought that gives it vitality. See, e.g., R. NozicK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 150 (1974) (distributive justice as what justice requires concerning holdings);
Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 2 LAW & PHIL. 5, 6 (1983)
(corrective justice as the annulling of wrongful gains and losses); Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50 (1979) (corrective justice as redress
for plaintiff of any violation of his rights); Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187, 201 (1981) (corrective justice as wealth maximization).
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be a contract, a tort, or the retention of an undue benefit. In distributive
justice the relationship between the parties is mediated by a scheme of
distribution; particular entitlements are a function not of a direct relation-
ship between the beneficiaries to the distribution but of the criterion ac-
cording to which the distribution is organized. Distributions embody what
Nozick has more recently termed "patterning,"6 and justifications under
distributions can typically be formulated in terms of "to [from] each ac-
cording to . . "68 Corrective and distributive justice represent the intel-
ligibility of unmediated and mediated interaction respectively.
These two forms of justice are categorically different and this difference
can be expressed in terms of the distinct notions of equality that each
employs.6" Corrective justice abstracts from the particular attributes of the
parties that are not essential to the intelligibility of doing and suffering.
Accordingly, whatever their social status or wealth or character, the par-
ties are considered equal at the outset of the transaction. This notional
equality represents the implicit rationality of the transaction. A wrong is
conceptualized as one party's disturbance of this equality at the expense of
the other. Corrective justice does not, therefore, refer merely to an official
act of dispute settlement; rather, the court's intervention is intelligible as
specifying what is implicit in the relationship that already exists between
the parties." In reflecting this relationship through the interpretation and
enforcement of its normative implications, the court is itself part of the
justificatory structure applicable to the transaction that it judges. The
function of the court is to preserve the initial equality by transferring
from one party to the other the fixed quantity that marks the deviation
from the transaction's implicit rationality. This sum represents either the
plaintiff's loss or the defendant's gain, and in paradigmatic instances of
67. See R. NozicK, supra note 66, at 155-60.
68. Id. at 160.
69. The distinction which Aristotle draws in NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 57, at 120, is
made perspicuous by Aquinas:
He [Aristotle] says first that the just thing that exists in transactions agrees somewhat with the
just thing directing distributions in this-that the just thing is equal, and the unjust thing,
unequal. But they differ in the fact that the equal in commutative justice is not observed
according to that proportionality, viz., geometrical, which was observed in distributive justice,
but according to arithmetical proportionality which is observed according to equality of quan-
tity, and not according to equality of proportion as in geometry. By arithmetical proportional-
ity six is a mean between eight and four, because it is in excess of the one and exceeds the
other by two. But there is not the same proportion on the one side and the other, for six is to
four in a ratio of three to two while eight is to six in a ratio of four to three. On the contrary
by geometrical proportionality the mean is exceeded and exceeds according to the same propor-
tion but not according to the same quantity. In this way six is a mean between nine and four,
since from both sides there is a three to two ratio. But there is not the same quantity, for nine
exceeds six by three and six exceeds four by two.
T. AQUINAS, supra note 58, at 410; cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 42-44 (discussing medians in
emotions and actions).
70. On the difference between corrective justice and dispute resolution, see Weinrib, Adjudica-




restitution, gain and loss will be identical. Because it restores the notional
antecedent equality between the parties by making one of them transfer a
fixed quantity to the other, corrective justice construes the interaction as
immediately pertaining to no more than two parties. In encompassing
both the wrong that one party has done to the other and the juridical
reflex rectifying the wrong, corrective justice represents the structure of
adjudication between plaintiff and defendant in private law. 1
In contrast, a distribution embodies not the transference of a quantity
but the fixing of a proportion. Distributive justice integrates three ele-
ments: the benefit or burden that is the subject of the distribution, the
recipients among whom the benefit or burden is to be distributed, and the
criterion according to which the distribution is to take place. The class of
participants and the subject matter of the distribution are notionally sepa-
rate. The entitlement of each member in the class to his share in the sub-
ject matter is determined by the application of the distributive criteria so
that, relative to this criterion, the entitlement of each is equal. Because the
integration of the three elements takes the form of a proportion, there is
no internal restriction on the number of participants: the more there are,
the smaller the portions, and the fewer there are, the greater the portions.
This can be contrasted with corrective justice, where the determination of
the quantity that restores the initial equality requires two parties, no more
(because the transfer of a quantity cannot restore equality as between
more than two) and no less (because if there were only one there would be
no transaction and nothing to correct).
C. The Formalism of the Forms
In this account justice does not in the first instance refer to substantive
principles; instead, it points to the different structures according to which
external interaction can be construed. Corrective justice discloses the form
of a transaction as the immediate interaction of two parties. The propor-
tional equality of distributive justice captures the structure of a distribu-
tion by indicating what distinguishes a distribution from a merely haphaz-
ard dispersion among persons and goods. The notions of equality
employed by the forms of justice are, like the forms themselves, formal
and not substantive. Equality is a term of relation appropriate to justice as
the ordering of external relationships, and it makes interaction intelligible
by operating with reference either to a quantity or to a proportion. 2
71. In the tradition upon which I am drawing, the structure of bipolar correction is portrayed in a
number of ways. Aristotle portrays it as the restoration of the antecedent equality of two lines. See
ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 122-23. Kant explicates the idea as effect and counter-effect or action
and reaction. See I. KANT, supra note 14, at 35-36; I. KANT, On the Common Saying: 'This May Be
True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,' in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 76 (H.
Reiss ed. 1970). Hegel describes it as negation of a negation. G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT, supra note 14, at 71-74.
72. Aristotle's discussion bears on a matter of recent controversy. Peter Westen argued that the
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Corrective and distributive justice are the forms that are immanent to
the understanding of transactions and distributions. As patterns of inter-
personal ordering they exhibit the nature of rationality in their respective
types of arrangement and do not refer to some external purpose towards
which these arrangements ought to be oriented. Each pattern represents a
different mode of coherence for external relationships. Corrective justice
treats the transaction between the doer and sufferer as a unity that can
find juridical expression in the sum that the defendant must transfer to
the successful plaintiff. Distributive justice treats the distribution as a
unity that integrates the benefit or burden to be distributed, the persons
who might be subject to it, and the criterion according to which the distri-
bution takes place. Since law, as an ordering of external relationships, is
directive of transactions and distributions in accordance with their imma-
nent intelligibility, the content of law is required to be an adequate reali-
zation of these forms of justice.
A specific legal content is intelligible to the extent of its adequacy to a
form of justice. Adjudication of private disputes can be understood as the
actualization of corrective justice, and the legislative and administrative
direction of the community as the pursuit of distributive justice. 3 This is
rhetoric of equality should be abandoned because equality is a formal relationship derived from ante-
rior substantive prescriptions and is therefore empty. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). For the ensuing debate, see Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1983); Westen, To Lure the Tarantula from Its Hole: A Re-
sponse, 83 COLUm. L. REv. 1186 (1983); Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas": Logical Positivist
Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Westen, On "Confusing Ideas": Reply,
91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982); Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81
MICH. L. REv. 575 (1983). The entire debate seems to miss the following fundamental point that lies
at the core of Aristotle's discussion. Even if equality is formal-indeed because equality is formal-it
is situated in the two different formal structures of corrective and distributive justice. It therefore
operates with respect to two different kinds of juridical relationship and with respect to two different
kinds of normative prescription. Since the formalism of equality expresses difference, equality is for-
mal without being empty: The formal equality of each form of justice has at least the negative content
of excluding the formal equality appropriate to the other. Indeed (if my argument in this section is
correct) this formal difference in the significance of equality marks the most basic division in juridical
thought. Westen's work is an elaboration of an argument that Hans Kelsen directed against Aristotle.
See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, supra, at 543; Westen, On Confusing Ideas: Reply, supra,
at 1157. For Kelsen's argument, see H. KEtsE, Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice, in WHAT IS JUS-
TICE? 110, 128-36 (1957). For a discussion of Kelsen's error, see Weinrib, supra note 57.
73. Criminal law has a more complex relationship to these two forms. It is not distributive justice
since the norms on which criminal law insists seem to crystallize conspicuous wrongs rather than to
embody the proportionate distributions of benefits and burdens. (For a different view, see H. MORRIS,
Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31 (1976), arguing that the criminal upsets
the distribution of benefits and burdens by taking an unfair advantage in a system of mutual con-
straints. This view has recently been effectively criticized by R. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS
205-17 (1986).) Rather, criminal law falls under corrective justice, since it presupposes the special
significance of doing and suffering. Criminal law diverges from tort law in two respects. First, a
criminal wrong requires mens rea, whereas a tort can result from the defendant's failure to live up to
an objectively reasonable standard. See Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAw
& PHIL. 37 (1983). Second, the state rather than the private victim enforces the criminal norm. These
differences between criminal law and tort law relate to corrective justice as follows. The negligent
tortfeasor may violate the equality of corrective justice by implicitly mistaking what this equality
requires (as where he acts to the best of his subjective capacity but falls short of the objectively
reasonable standard, see Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837)), but this mistake does
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not to say that the positive law of these domains is substantively just; only
that it is internally intelligible in terms of the conceptual structure of cate-
gories of external interaction. The very point of the forms of justice, and
what gives them their critical bite, is that they are forms: Inasmuch as
they set out the implicit patterns of interaction that illuminate juridical
relationships from within, they also provide an internal standpoint of crit-
icism that is decisive for law because it cannot be deflected or escaped by a
change of standpoint.
Corrective and distributive justice are the most abstract forms that
render juridical relationships intelligible. Indeed so abstract are they that
Aristotle was able to represent them mathematically as different functions
of equality, the one quantitative and the other proportional. Each refers to
an inclusive notion of interaction and to a corresponding conception of
juridical coherence. Corrective justice is the ordering principle of transac-
tions, whether these be delictual, restitutionary, or contractual: 4 It ab-
stracts from the particular contours of a given transaction to its most gen-
eral quality as an episode of doing and suffering. Coherence here lies in
the singleness of the relationship of doing and suffering. Similarly, distrib-
utive justice abstracts from all particular distributions to the shape they
share as distributions. Coherence here is a harmony of criterion, benefit
(or burden), and beneficiaries (or burden-bearers).
These forms of justice are structurally different and mutually irreduci-
ble. Just as restoring the equality of two quantities is a categorically dif-
ferent mathematical operation from continuing a proportion, so the two
forms of justice cannot be assimilated to each other. The mathematical
terms in which Aristotle explains the different functionings of equality in
corrective and distributive justice certify that these two forms are concep-
not deny the applicability of such equality to his action. Tort is thus only a particular wrong to a
particular victim, who can then reestablish his notionally equal position through an action for dam-
ages. In contrast, the criminal commits a willful harm, thus implicitly assigning to others the status of
mere means to his own satisfaction. Mens tea is the expression in positive law of the criminal's setting
his face against the very idea of the formal equality of corrective justice. This is not only a particular
wrong to a particular victim, but an affront to the general equality of all potential doers and sufferers.
Since the state is the representative of this general equality, state prosecution and punishment undoes
the general wrong. For criminal law, the failure to conform to the equality of corrective justice takes
the form of a wrong against the very notion of that equality. This explanation draws heavily on
Hegel's Philosophy of Right. See G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 14, at 64-74.
For an extended explication of Hegel's text, see Nicholson, Hegel on Crime, 3 HIsT. POL. THOUGHT
103 (1982).
74. Some scholars see distributive justice as the general ordering principle in contract law. See,
e.g., Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980). Others see particu-
lar doctrines such as expectation damages as informed by distributive rather than corrective justice.
See, e.g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936).
This view, however, is mistaken, both on textual and on conceptual grounds. The relationship of
promisor and promisee is as unmediated as the relationship of tortfeasor and victim. The immediacy
of corrective justice refers not to the proximate physical sequence that is typical of tort law, but to the
intelligibility of the plaintiff-defendant relationship as a bipolar one that precludes the continuous
proportion of distributive justice. A contract expresses not a mediating criterion, but the terms result-
ing from the mutual recognition by the parties of each other as immediately interacting persons. For a
detailed treatment of this, see Benson, supra note 63. See also ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 117.
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tually distinct. They constitute the most abstractly comprehensive struc-
tures of justification and thus cannot be combined into a single overarch-
ing justificatory structure. Each form is its own distinctive and self-
contained unity. 5 They both pertain to the ordering of external relations
among persons, but they order these relations in different ways.
Because the forms of justice represent mutually irreducible conceptions
of coherence for juridical relationships, no single juridical relationship can
coherently combine the two forms. If a corrective element is mixed with a
distributive one, each necessarily undermines the justificatory force of the
other, and the relationship cannot manifest either unifying structure. Such
mixing was the root of the problem in our loss-spreading example. The
principle that accident losses should be distributed so as to minimize their
felt impact has the proportional structure of distributive justice; it man-
dates the sharing of burdens in accordance with a criterion. Its use in tort
law, however, fails to achieve distributive justice, since continuing the pro-
portion by applying the principle to everyone within its reach is inconsis-
tent with its being channelled through the doer and sufferer of a single
harm. Conversely, since the issue of how the loss is ultimately spread is
not part of the intelligibility of the relationship of doing and suffering as
such (indeed the best conduit for loss-spreading might be some third
party), the orienting of tort law toward loss-spreading cannot adequately
actualize corrective justice. The combination of elements from both forms
of justice ensures that neither form is achieved. And since coherence de-
pends on the adequacy of the law's content to some form or other, loss-
spreading as a tort doctrine is incoherent.
The forms of justice are justificatory structures. They furnish the mor-
phology to which the justification of a juridical relationship must conform.
A relationship can be construed as one of corrective justice if the justifica-
tion applicable to it is an explication of the equality applicable to doing
and suffering. Conversely, a relationship instantiates distributive justice if
the argument that supports it has the patterning of a proportion. What
matters is that a justification be coherent in terms of one or the other of
75. It is sometimes said that corrective justice is derivative from distributive justice because correc-
tive justice presupposes holdings, and holdings are a matter of distributive justice. See, e.g., Radbruch,
Legal Philosophy, in THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN 74 (K. Wilk
trans. 1950). This is wrong on two accounts. First, it is not the case that the setting of holdings must
necessarily be conceived as a matter of distributive justice. The Kantian and Hegelian theories of
property are explicitly not theories of distributive justice. See I. KANT, THE PHiLOSOPH OF LAW
61-99 (W. Hastie trans. 1887); G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 14, at 40-57.
Secondly, even if holdings were intelligible solely as distributive justice, the dependence of corrective
justice on a previous distribution does not diminish the autonomy of the two forms of justice. These
forms are the structures of justification applicable to external interaction. The fact that corrective
justice must accept the distribution as given does not mean that the justification of the distribution is
an aspect of justification in corrective justice. What matters for corrective justice is that the distribu-
tion exists, not that the distribution is justified. Corrective justice's mode of justification can operate
against the background of a distribution without incorporating into its justificatory structure the justi-
fication of the distribution.
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the forms that constitute the broadest and most abstract conceptions of
justificatory coherence. A relationship whose justification is not adequate
to either of these structures is unintelligible; in creating such a relation-
ship, positive law commits a juridical mistake.
Because the forms of justice are justificatory structures, their concern is
with the coherence of the justifications for legal arrangements, not with
subject matter of these arrangements as brute facts. Accordingly, the ef-
fects that one person might have on another cannot be preclassified as
belonging to one or the other form. For the formalist the crucial consider-
ation is not what happened but how one is to understand the justificatory
structure that is latent in the legal arrangements that might deal with
what happened. 6 My injuring you is in itself neither a transaction that
calls for corrective justice nor a distribution that falls under distributive
justice. It will be handled correctively if you sue me in tort so that the
issue becomes whether the relationship of my doing and your suffering
justifies my paying you damages. Alternatively, it will be handled distrib-
utively if you have recourse to a fund that, for example, compensates in-
jured persons in proportion to the seriousness of their injuries.
Formalism, accordingly, is not a kind of jurisprudential federalism with
different incidents assigned to the jurisdiction of either corrective or dis-
tributive authority. Nor does formalism provide a basis for preferring to
treat the facts of the world in accordance with one form rather than the
other; such preference can come neither from within either form nor from
any overarching form. Formalism's concern is entirely with the coherence
of legal arrangements and with the way that the doctrinal and institu-
tional components of law manifest that coherence. The forms of justice are
the most abstract and inclusive representations of the kinds of unity that
can be expressed in juridical relationships. Coherence is, therefore, a mat-
ter of the adequacy of the law's content to one or the other of these forms.
V. POLITICS AND FORMALISM
With these forms in hand, we can now consider the relationship be-
tween law and politics. As we saw at the outset of this essay, legal formal-
ism is notorious for distinguishing between the two. The purpose of this
section is to sustain and illuminate the distinction by reference to the
forms of juridical interaction outlined in Part IV.
A. Politics and the Judicial Role
The distinction between law and politics manifests itself in scholarship
as a controversy about the judicial role. Adherents of the distinction have
seen the judge as the guardian and expositor of whatever is non-politically
76. See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGiCA II-II, Q. 61, Art. 3.
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legal, the nature of which emerges from a consideration of the limits ap-
propriate to judicial, as opposed to legislative, lawmaking. Private law
raises this issue in connection with the propriety of reforming legal doc-
trine through the courts." In constitutional and administrative law, the
dispute concerns the status of the values underlying judicial review of leg-
islative and administrative action."
Pointing to the courts' relative lack of institutional competence and
democratic accountability, proponents of a distinct judicial role have de-
marcated legitimate court activity by reference to two considerations.
First, the courts' role is anchored by the preexisting body of rules, stan-
dards, policies, and principles from which courts move by a process of
"reasoned elaboration." 9 Second, the courts are expected to distance
themselves from the realm of "current political controversy," so that they
are restricted to the area left unclaimed by the political agenda of the
day."0
These formulations render the judicial role a contingent matter. While
implicitly asserting a crucial difference in principle between the juridical
and the political, they would have this difference hinge on whatever hap-
pens to receive the attention of courts and legislatures respectively.
Whether a particular factor, such as loss-spreading, is legitimately within
judicial competence would not depend on its nature as a justification but
on whether it (or something from which it can be elaborated) has already
ensconced itself in the legal doctrine, or on whether it has, or can be ex-
pected to, become a matter of political controversy.""
For the formalist these considerations are insufficiently grounded and
are thus, at best, shadows of the truth. The formalist seeks to connect this
controversy about judicial role and the insight on which it is based-that
"[t]o call a court 'political' is merely to deny it the character of a court of
law" 82-to the features of form that characterize and give coherence to the
understanding of juridical relationships. These features are conceptual
rather than contingent. They refer not to what may have come within the
purview of judicial or legislative treatment in a given jurisdiction, but to
the elements of structure that mark the intelligibility of external interac-
tion among persons generally.
Formalism is especially relevant to the controversy over the judicial
role. Proponents of a limited judicial role do not-or at least need
77. See, e.g., Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229 (1981).
78. For a survey of the problematic nature of these values, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST 43-72 (1980).
79. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 43, at 162-68.
80. R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 92 (1969).
81. Moreover, since an issue can become politically controversial without its being definitively
resolved, the second consideration gives those who can influence the political agenda a kind of heck-
ler's veto over the direction of judicial activity.




not-dispute the desirability of the doctrinal innovations that the judiciary
may introduce. Their contention would be unaffected by the concession
that the specific new doctrine urged on the court is meritorious. At issue is
not what is to be done but who is to do it. The claim is that although
certain arguments may justify a specific policy, they are not the sort of
justification that is pertinent to the adjudicative process. At issue is not the
soundness of certain justifications but their coherence with the justificatory
structure appropriate to adjudication.
The formalist understanding of the juridical, as opposed to the political,
centers on the immanence of the legal forms to the intelligibility of the
interactions that they order. Corrective and distributive justice are not ex-
trinsic impositions on transactions and distributions. They are appropriate
to transactions and distributions because they are the justificatory struc-
tures that inhere in these two understandings of interaction. An interac-
tion is intelligible as a transaction only inasmuch as it is capable of being
ordered by corrective justice; its conformity to this ordering is the perfec-
tion of living up to its own intelligible nature as a transaction. The same
applies, mutatis mutandis, to distributions.
The juridical can be defined as that which is contained within the intel-
ligibility of external interaction. The forms of justice represent the modes
of understanding that pertain to interaction from within; the expression of
these forms in a specific legal system is the province of the juridical. The
forms' immanence to the understanding of the interactions they govern
means that officials charged with explicating the juridical-in our legal
culture, pre-eminently judges-can treat the ordering of an interaction as
an interpretive function in which they draw out the juridical significance
of the features that unify the interaction from within. Adjudication in-
volves holding the particular transaction or distribution to its coherence as
a transaction or a distribution. The judge is prohibited from orienting the
juridical relationship to some external goal of the judge's choosing. The
justificatory structures of corrective and distributive justice set the concep-
tual limits of the judge's jurisdiction, and the judge's role is to apply, in
the context of a particular episode of adjudication, the form of justice ap-
propriate to it.
Corrective or distributive justice need not be expressly considered by the
judges or mentioned in their judgments. These forms of justice are catego-
ries of legal philosophy, not ingredients of positive law. They exhibit the
structures of justification latent in a sophisticated legal system, and thus
underlie its discourse without being themselves necessarily parts of it. The
forms of justice are, as we have seen, the most abstract conceptions of
juridical relations. Even if these abstractions are not explicit in positive
law, they must be implicit in positive law if its content is coherent, be-
cause they represent the ways in which a juridical relationship can be
conceived as a unity. The discourse of a sophisticated legal system, i.e.,
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one that values coherence, will for particular controversies and sets of con-
troversies tend to actualize one or the other of these implicit abstractions.
The common law of negligence, for example, does not explicitly refer to
corrective justice. Its categories of wrongdoing and causation, however,
can be read as capturing in the context of delictual transactions the ab-
stract equality of doing and suffering that is at the heart of corrective
justice. 3 The same can be said for contract law's doctrines of considera-
tion, offer and acceptance, expectation damages, and unconscionability.84
Accordingly, the judge gives voice to the specifically juridical when he or
she elaborates and applies elements of positive law that express or specify
aspects of these forms of justice.
The political, in contrast to the juridical, refers to considerations whose
intelligibility stands outside the interconnecting aspects of juridical form.
Political determinations are extrinsic to juridical form in the sense that,
although expressible through form, they do not derive justificatory force
entirely from form. They are expressible through form because otherwise
they could not be intelligible as part of a coherent ordering. However,
they must be justified by more than their participation in an internally
coherent structure of justification. Any particular political determination
must have a desirability that is independent of the elucidation or specifica-
tion of form.
B. Politics and Distributive Justice
The home of the political is distributive justice. In corrective justice, all
that is present is the immediate relationship of person to person; nothing
extrinsic is relevant to this relationship. In distributive justice, by contrast,
the relation between persons is mediated by the criterion that assigns
things to them in accordance with a proportional equality. The whole
complex of persons, things, and criterion is an expression of a particular
mediating purpose. Because it mediates, this purpose is not immediate to
the relationship of person to person but is brought to bear upon them
from outside. The intelligibility of this purpose is thus extrinsic to the
relationship of person to person as such.
In the case of distributions, an external orientation is both possible and
required. Distributive justice, it is true, is the internal integration of per-
sons and things according to some criterion, so that the formal adequacy
of a given distribution is a matter of integrating the elements constituting
distributive justice's distinctive unity. But this internal aspect must be sup-
plemented from the outside. Although the elements of distributive justice
are internally structured, the fixing of a particular distribution involves
selection from among many possible different distributions. Distributive
83. See Weinrib, supra note 49.
84. See Benson, supra note 63.
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justice goes to the inner coherence of a distribution, not to the choice of
one distribution over another. Assume, for instance, that one wanted to
replace or supplement tort law by introducing a distributive scheme of
compensation for personal injuries. A decision must be made as to the
class of injuries for which compensation will be paid, the persons who will
be burdened by the levies necessary to finance the scheme, the criteria by
which recovery will be limited if the need for compensation exceeds the
available financing, and so on. 5 For any such particular distribution one
can require that its various elements fit with one another, but the notion
of internal ordering is not sufficiently powerful to establish the boundaries
or the criterion of the scheme. Whatever distribution is chosen must live
up to the coherence of distributive justice. Distributive justice, however,
understood as the coherent ordering of persons, things, and criterion, can-
not single out which of the available distributions is to be preferred.
A particular distribution is the product of political institutions that have
the capacity and authority to evaluate the full range of possible distribu-
tions, and that are accountable for their choices from among those pos-
sibilities. Hence, considerations of institutional competence and electoral
responsibility figure prominently in discussions of the legal process.86
Since no particular distribution can be excluded ab initio, competence and
accountability must be of a global character. The authorization of some
distributions and the rejection of others involve decisions about the inter-
ests of all members of the community. Those responsible for these deci-
sions should correspondingly be answerable to all. Judges, who have lim-
ited control over their own agendas, who see controversy through the
prism of bipolar argument, who must funnel the effects of their judgments
through litigants, and who are relatively insulated from accountability to
the community, are not appropriately situated to select from among possi-
ble distributions.8 7
A political element is therefore present in distributions. A distribution
must distribute something and it must distribute it to particular persons
according to a criterion that embodies a particular purpose, to be chosen
from the many available purposes. Distributive justice implies that a po-
litical authority must define and particularize the scope or criterion of any
scheme of distribution. This selection cannot be completely insulated from
the interplay of power, persuasion, sympathy, and interest that character-
izes the political process. The purpose of a specific distribution is not
85. For a discussion of the relevant considerations, see Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and
Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 341.
86. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 43, at 398, 662.
87. I am neither claiming nor denying that the accountability of political institutions is a concep-
tual correlate of distributive justice. This issue would require a careful consideration of the connection
between political and legal theory that is beyond the scope of the present essay. It is sufficient for my
purposes here that, given the existence of accountable political institutions, we can recognize that such
institutions are adequate to the external orientation of distributive justice in a way that courts are not.
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elaborated from within distributive justice, but must be authoritatively in-
corporated into the schedule of collective aims. Until then, this distribution
is merely one of any number of possible distributions.
Although distributive justice requires politics, it is not reducible to
politics. What is common to all possible distributions is precisely that they
are distributions, not just haphazard dispersions; they are therefore coher-
ent only insofar as they are expressions of distributive justice. Since dis-
tributive justice is the form generic to all distributions, no matter what
their particular purposes, its justificatory structure is implicit in them all
without exception. Political authority cannot make its extrinsic purposes
part of an intelligible order unless its prescriptions conform to distributive
justice. Consequently, any distribution must respect the relationship
among the conceptual elements out of which distributive justice is
constituted.
Distributive justice, as the integration of persons and things in accor-
dance with a criterion, incorporates two related presuppositions. First,
distributive justice postulates a distinction between things and persons. If
a distribution is to observe the ordering characteristic of its form, it cannot
treat persons as things. The difference between a person and a thing is
that a thing can be a means to any end for which it is useful, whereas the
nature of a person is to be an end and never only a means to an end. 8
The implicitness of this Kantian idea in distributive justice means that the
instrumentalism of extrinsic purpose is constrained by the non-
instrumental notion of personhood. The immanent intelligibility of dis-
tributive ordering presupposes that the recipient of the distributive benefit
or burden can be immanently-and thus non-instrumentally-conceived
in terms of being one's own end.
Second, distributive justice presupposes that the criterion of distribution
applies equally to all who fall under its justificatory force, without under-
inclusion or overinclusion. Implicit in distributive justice as a justificatory
structure is the notion that equality is conceptually necessary to this mode
of understanding juridical relations. Equality, as used here, is not a sub-
stantive ideal that stands outside distribution, nor does it refer to any par-
ticular subject matter (such as welfare or resources8 ) whose equal distri-
bution is independently desirable. Rather, it is applicable to whatever is
being distributed because it is immanent to the understanding of a distri-
bution as an internally intelligible arrangement. Accordingly, a distribu-
tion decreed by positive law that does not observe equality is defective
from the standpoint of its own intelligibility.
88. This idea has it roots in I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46 (L.
Beck trans. 1959).
89. For an opposing view of equality, see Dworkin, What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Wel-




Because personhood and equality are conceptual components in the
form of distributive justice, and because distributive justice, being a form,
is a principle of unity, personhood and equality are themselves interde-
pendent. Those who share in the distribution are entitled to demand
equality only because they are persons and thus not available for use ac-
cording to the distributor's pleasure. Similarly, a mark of their per-
sonhood is the claim they have to equal standing in the distribution. A
distribution that did not embody the equality of persons-a checkerboard
scheme, for instance9-would fail to manifest an intelligible integration
of persons and things with a distributive criterion. Instead of harmonizing
the components of distributive justice, it would throw them together. Such
a distribution would make inclusion or exclusion a matter of sport; the
persons affected would implicitly be not ends in themselves but playthings
for the distributing authority.
Personhood and equality are the presuppositions that make distributive
justice conceivable. In their absence, distributive justice as a form would
disappear. Bereft of the principle that gives them order from within, dis-
tributions would be internally indistinguishable from haphazard disper-
sions. Only the operation of extrinsic purpose on a juridically unintel-
ligible world would remain. Distributions would be whatever political
authority makes them. An assertion that the pattern of distribution was
unintelligible or random could be decisively met by pointing to its being
an expression of political purpose validly enacted into positive law. Dis-
tributive justice thus preserves distributions as juridical relationships
among the persons who are to share in them rather than as instances of
largess bestowed by political authority on whatsoever terms it pleases.
Legislative and administrative action can legitimately be made to re-
spect the conceptual contours of personhood and equality that underlie the
ordering of distributions. The positive law may give effect to the funda-
mental values of personhood and equality in a variety of ways: by incor-
porating them into the techniques for construing statutes, by elaborating
notions of natural justice or fairness for administrative procedures, or by
enshrining specifications of personhood and equality into constitutional
documents. The manifestation of these values represents the realization in
positive law of the conceptual elements that constitute distributive justice
and that are accordingly necessary for the juridical ordering of the extrin-
sic goals pursued by political authority.
As the expositors of the juridical, judges have a legitimate role in devel-
oping the notions of personhood and equality. Although judicial review
does not allow the substitution of the court's preferred distribution for the
one laid down by the authoritative political organ, a court can insist that,
in setting up and executing a scheme of distributive justice, political au-
90. See R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 178-84 (1986).
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thority not treat persons as things or violate the equality of persons under
the distributional criterion. Juridical activity of this sort does not encroach
on the prerogatives of the political organ; it only insists that the favored
distributions conform to their own intelligible structure.
In requiring respect for the values of personhood and equality, courts
are not engaging in a new distribution. Personhood and equality are not
things that lie stored up somewhere waiting to be dispensed by a political
authority according to a certain distributive criterion. They are not them-
selves distributed, but are the conceptual grounds for the possibility of
distributing anything. Judicial review can therefore legitimately give spec-
ificity to the concept of the person and to the norm of equality that dis-
tributive justice postulates.
Distributions have a two-fold intelligibility, facing outward to the ex-
trinsic purposes that they serve and inward to the form they embody. Ac-
cordingly, a distribution must be understood both from the instrumental
standpoint of its particular extrinsic purpose and from the conceptual
standpoint of its universally immanent structure. The former dimension of
distribution is political, the latter juridical. The different institutional
competences and spheres of legitimacy for legislative and for judicial ac-
tion reflect these two dimensions of distribution, both of which must be
encompassed in the understanding of distributive justice.
C. Politics and Corrective Justice
The situation in corrective justice is categorically different because
politics is absent. Since the bilateral interaction between the parties is un-
derstood as immediate, no extrinsic purpose can intrude itself. Private law
may have political consequences and may be the result of a political deci-
sion to establish the appropriate institutions of adjudication, but qua real-
ization of corrective justice, it has no political aspect." The parties to a
transaction are active and passive with respect to a single harm; the signif-
icance of their interaction lies not in the specification by political authority
of a collective external goal but in the interpretation of the immediate
intersection of doing and suffering as each party pursues his or her own
goal.
Corrective justice is therefore immune to the external ends that charac-
terize distributions. This immunity manifests itself in the different ways
in which corrective and distributive justice are particularized. In distribu-
tive justice, the specification of a distribution involves a choice from among
many different possibilities. A workers' compensation scheme, a crime-
victim compensation program, and a more general accident compensation
plan are different distributions each of which exemplifies the category of
91. In classical terminology, the creation and the consequences of something pertains to efficient
causation, not to form. See ARISTOTLE, PHYsics II, § 3 (R. Hope trans. 1961).
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distributive justice in personal injury compensation, just as apples and or-
anges are different examples of the category of fruit. Every distribution
has its own separate integrity as the actualization of its own specific pur-
pose and scope; together they constitute the inventory of distributions from
which the political authority may or may not select. In contrast, when
construing a transaction in accordance with corrective justice, the adjudi-
cator does not choose one scheme of correction over another but rather
specifies the meaning of corrective justice with respect to the transaction in
question. The varieties of distribution are the several relationships that
can be mediated through different distributive purposes, but as between
doer and sufferer, a single relationship of corrective justice gets worked
out in accordance with its particular facts and history. Whereas the cate-
gory of distributive justice encompasses different instantiating distributions
from which the distributor may choose, the category of corrective justice is
a single non-instrumental conception whose meaning is judicially elabo-
rated in the different circumstances of its application.
In illuminating from within the juridical relationships that exemplify it,
corrective justice excludes their being oriented toward any extrinsic goal.
Corrective justice is intelligible solely in non-instrumental terms. An un-
derstanding of corrective justice by reference to something beyond itself
transforms it into what it is not and thus fails to grasp it as it is.
The ascription of an external purpose to a transaction is incompatible
with the structure of corrective justice in at least two ways. First, correc-
tive justice holds the parties to the equality inherent in their immediate
interaction. An extrinsic purpose, however, cannot be true to the un-
mediated relationship of doer and sufferer; it must favor one of the inter-
acting parties and thereby contradict the initial equality that marks cor-
rective justice as a distinctive form. For instance, the analysis of tort law
in terms of possible aims such as compensation or deterrence92 is incom-
patible with the understanding of tort law as the operation of corrective
justice. The first of these aims is intelligible with reference to the plaintiff
only; the second with reference to the defendant only. Yet the form of
corrective justice postulates that each party has an equal standing and that
neither is subordinate to the other or superfluous to their relationship.
The second way in which the projection of an external purpose onto a
transaction is incompatible with corrective justice is that the purpose in
question cannot be necessarily limited to the interaction of the two parties
to the transaction. The purpose must embrace all those who fall under it;
the immediate link between plaintiff and defendant is irrelevant. Since a
transaction does not realize a collective goal, there is no necessary reason
that the scope of the transaction should be coextensive with the operation
of any purpose. Take tort law again as an example. If the purpose of tort
92. See Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137, 144-72 (1951).
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law is considered to be the provision of financial support to those who
suffer from personal injuries, the claim of a plaintiff can be no stronger
than the claim of any person who is injured even non-tortiously and who
therefore falls within the ambit of the purpose. Similarly, if one conceives
of the purpose of tort law as the deterrence of wrongful behavior, there is
no warrant for restricting the deterring sanction to those instances of
wrongful behavior which materialize in injury. The purpose as such is
indifferent to the transactional context of the tortious injury.
These two incompatibilities between corrective justice and exogenously
introduced goals are connected as follows. Corrective justice is the inte-
grated unity of the doer and the sufferer of a single harm. The extrinsic
goal disassembles this unity by isolating an aspect that would favor one or
the other of the litigants and then bending the entire relationship to its
promotion. But once the transaction is decomposed into competing aspects,
the preferred goal has a vitality of its own that cannot rationally be con-
fined to the bounds of the transaction's now disintegrated unity.9 3 It must
float free to cover all the instances that fall under its independent sway."
In displaying the ordering that constitutes a transaction and that distin-
guishes it from a distribution, corrective justice reveals the inappropriate-
ness of an instrumental interpretation of immediate interaction. The
transactional equality between plaintiff and defendant, unlike the propor-
tion that characterizes distributive justice, cannot be oriented towards an
93. Private law is sheer mystery if it is considered to be solely the combination of independently
valid goals. For instance, Marc Franklin's argument for a no-fault compensation scheme is animated
by the irrationality of the respective plaintiffs' lottery and defendants' lottery that is set up when the
independently conceived interest of each litigant is tied to his relationship with the other. See Frank-
lin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. Rv.
774 (1967). Whatever the strength of other arguments for a compensation scheme, this criticism of
tort law is weak: Since its critical standpoint is external to the integrity of the delictual relationship, it
is not a criticism of tort law but merely an ascribing to tort law of the defects of the critic's
misunderstanding.
94. This conceptual dynamic is explained perfectly by Hegel in his critique of empiricism:
In an organic relation to the manifold qualities into which the unity is divided (if they are not
simply to be enumerated), one certain determinate aspect must be emphasized in order to reach
a unity over this multiplicity; and that determinate aspect must be regarded as the essence of
the relation. But the totality of the organic is precisely what cannot be thereby attained, and
the remainder of the relation, excluded from the determinate aspect that was selected, falls
under the dominion of this aspect which is elevated to be the essence and purpose of the
relation. Thus, for example, to explain the relation of marriage, procreation, the holding of
goods in common, or something else is proposed [as the determinant] and, from such a determi-
nate aspect, is made prescriptive as the essence of the relation; the whole organic relation is
delimited and contaminated. Or, in the case of punishment, one specific aspect is singled out-
the criminal's moral reform, or the damage done, or the effect of his punishment on others, or
the criminal's own notion of the punishment before he committed the crime, or the necessity of
making this notion a reality by carrying out the threat, etc. And then some such single aspect is
made the purpose and essence of the whole. The natural consequence is that, since such a
specific aspect has no necessary connection with the other specific aspects which can be found
and distinguished, there arises an endless struggle to find the necessary bearing and predomi-
nance of one over the others; and since inner necessity, non-existent in singularity, is missing,
each aspect can perfectly well vindicate its independence of the other.
G. HEGEL, NATURAL LAW 60 (T. Knox trans. 1975).
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extrinsic objective. The exclusion of extrinsic purposes means that instru-
mentalism plays no role here.95 Because corrective justice is therefore
purely juridical, its elaboration can be assigned to the judiciary. Private
law is the detailed and concrete elaboration of corrective justice by the
authoritative judicial institutions. Corrective justice yields a completely
non-instrumental and non-political understanding of law.
D. The Normative Force of the Forms of Justice
Formalism thus derives the distinction between the juridical and the
political from the immanent rationality of the forms of justice. Corrective
justice exhibits the form of rationality indigenous to transactions and
presents a structure of interaction that is immune to an understanding in
terms of extrinsic purpose. Distributive justice is the ordering immanent
to distributions; it structures and constrains the operation of the extrinsic
purposes that characterize particular distributions. Law is by its nature
apolitical to the extent that it translates the conceptual contours of these
forms into a legal reality.
Recall that Unger described formalism as postulating an "immanent
moral rationality.""6 The immanence and the rationality (or intelligibility)
of the forms of justice have perhaps now been sufficiently exhibited and
related to the distinction between law and politics. What, however, is the
moral force of these forms? For clearly they must have a moral dimension
if the law is required to conform to their structure. Although they describe
the nature of coherence in the content of sophisticated legal systems, the
95. For a specific account of the difficulties besetting instrumentalist considerations in the context
of private law, see Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Lia-
bility Rules; 4 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. - (forthcoming). With reference to a variety of legal situations,
Trebilcock outlines the indeterminacies resulting from the attempt to achieve efficiency through judi-
cial attention to insurance. He classifies these indeterminacies under three headings: (i) the uncer-
tainty generated in determining whether to confine the search for the best insurer to the immediate
parties; (ii) the uncertainty over which of these two parties is the better insurer in view of the fact that
the defendant can more readily estimate ex ante the likelihood of injury, whereas the plaintiff can
more readily estimate the extent ex ante of the damage; and (iii) uncertainty as to trade-offs between
insurance and other efficiency rationales. These three kinds of indeterminacy follow in the tracks of
formalist objections to the application of extrinsic purposes to the immediate external interactions of
corrective justice. The first arises from the indifference of extrinsic purpose to the immediacy of the
transaction; the second from the decomposition of the unified normative relationship of doer and suf-
ferer into aspects that are independently relevant to one or the other of them; the third from the fact
that all extrinsic purposes are arbitrary with respect to the corrective justice relationship, and that
therefore this arbitrariness generates uncertainties in the trade-offs possible among them. It should be
noted that the difficulties Trebilcock discusses are not, as his formulations imply, mere uncertainties,
similar in kind to the question of who will win the World Series fifteen years from now, for which we
have at this moment too many possibilities and too little knowledge. Rather, these indeterminacies
reflect the incoherence of applying to the bipolar relationships of corrective justice the extrinsic pur-
poses available to distributive justice. This lack of fit between the normative considerations of eco-
nomic analysis and the legal context is structural, not factual. Seen in this light, Trebilcock's powerful
but straightforward exposition indicates why the normative economic analysis of private law can
never, despite the intellectual virtuosity of its distinguished expositors, rise above unilluminating
technicality.
96. See Unger, supra note 8, at 571.
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implicit demand that they issue to the positive law attests to a normative
relevance that overrides any extrinsic political purpose. On what is this
relevance based? How do the forms of justice secure a dimension of
normativity that is independent of the justification of a particular extrinsic
purpose or of the lawmaking process by which this purpose is brought
into existence as a matter of positive law?
The answer to this cannot, of course, be derived from any good ulterior
to these forms; if it were, their intelligibility as justificatory structures
would be dependent on an extrinsic value. As a result, their normativity
would be secured at the price of their immanence. Maintenance of the
internal perspective requires that the normativity of juridical relationships
be as immanent as their intelligibility. In other words, their moral force
must come from the very integration of immanence and intelligibility in a
juridical relationship. Because the justification of all immediate and medi-
ated juridical relationships must-if there is to be such justifica-
tion-conform to the shape of one or the other of these structures, the
forms of justice carry with them the seeds of their own moral force. For
the formalist, corrective and distributive justice are normative not because
something else makes them normative, but because they constitute the es-
sential nature of normativity with respect to the external relationships of
persons.
The non-instrumental normativity that undergirds the forms of justice
is to be found in Kantian legal philosophy. The forms of justice transpose
into the intelligibility of external interaction the Kantian notion of obli-
gatoriness. On the one hand, Kantian normativity is presupposed in the
forms as a condition of their being justificatory. On the other, the struc-
tures of the two forms are themselves the juridical expressions of this pre-
supposed Kantian normativity.
Because, as I shall argue, Kantian normativity is presupposed by the
forms of justice, it does not supervene upon them from the outside as an
optional or arbitrary postulate. Rather, it is implicit in them as justifica-
tory structures. If we take the forms of justice as hitherto explicated and
inquire into the preconditions of their justificatory function, we are ine-
luctably brought to their Kantian grounding. This is because the forms
are so abstract that they do not incorporate a determinate notion of the
good and therefore can be based only on a notion of Kantian right. The
Aristotelian forms of justice and Kantian right provide dovetailing ac-
counts of the non-instrumental intelligibility of juridical interaction. Kant-
ian right traces this intelligibility back to the free acts that are necessitated
by categorical imperatives of reason. Inasmuch as Kantian right is implicit
in the forms of justice, they are grounded in a conception of normativ-
ity-indeed, in a particularly stringent conception of normativity.Y
97. I am not concerned here to describe or defend Kantian right (which I have done elsewhere, see
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Consider first corrective justice, the presuppositions of which are all the
clearer because it excludes the mediation of extrinsic purpose. Two fea-
tures of corrective justice that are embedded in private law bear on the
form's immanent normativity. First, corrective justice ignores such factors
as the wealth, virtue, or merit of the interacting parties. 8 Second, the
rectification worked by corrective justice is a restoration of an initial no-
tional equality. The quantity transferred from defendant to plaintiff rep-
resents the amount by which this initial equality has been disturbed. This
equality is itself formal and does not refer to the parties' particular attrib-
utes of need, merit, or status. In corrective justice the equality of the
plaintiff and the defendant is neutral to all the particularities of condition
or character that mark their difference and their possible inequality.
Corrective justice ignores the particular attributes of the litigants be-
cause these attributes are not relevant to the transaction as such. In cor-
rective justice the interaction of the parties is immediate; there is no place
for consideration of the varying degrees in which they partake of particu-
lar qualities and in accordance with which the mediating proportion of
distributive justice might be constructed. In this respect corrective justice
postulates an extreme version of interpersonal externality. All that matters
is the interaction itself.
The parties may be conceived to be so completely external to one an-
other because each is assumed to be internally constituted as a single per-
son who acts and produces effects upon the circumambient world. The
equality that corrective justice presumes is that which parties owe each
other as persons with an equal capacity for acting.9 Corrective justice
conceives of the parties as freely active, purposive beings. As such, they
are not determined to perform or pursue any given action or purpose; the
essence of their activity and their purposiveness lies precisely in their be-
ing self-determined. This capacity for self-determination is an abstraction
from all particularity; its very abstractness as a capacity is what allows it
to be equally applicable to all actors. Corrective justice refers only to the
person's formal capacity for free purposive action, while remaining indif-
ferent to the background from which particular exercises of this capacity
issue. In abstracting from the concrete richness of human particularity,
corrective justice pays it the supreme compliment of seeing it as concep-
tually posterior to the operation of a self-determining will.
The presupposition of corrective justice outlined here will be familiar to
readers of Kant and Rawls as moral personality. 00 Indeed, corrective jus-
Weinrib, supra note 4), but only to outline how the elements of Kant's legal philosophy are presup-
posed in the Aristotelian forms of justice.
98. The significance of this was first noted by Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at
120-21, 1132a2-7.
99. In this conception, no individual is synonymous with his particular determinations: Of no
particular action can it be said that it could not have been otherwise.
100. See I. KANT, supra note 14, at 24; Rawls, Kantian Constructivism and Moral Theory 77 J.
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tice can fairly be described in Kantian terms as the point of view from
which noumenal selves see each other, 01 i.e., as the ordering of immediate
interactions that Kantian moral persons would recognize as expressive of
their natures. Kantian moral persons are duty bound to interact with each
other on terms appropiiate to their formally equal status: Their acts, as
the acts of freely purposive beings, must be capable of co-existence with
the freedom of everyone.1 2 This normative requirement is not introduced
from the outside but attaches at once as a conceptual consequence of their
being moral persons.0 3 Corrective justice's presupposition of moral per-
sonality therefore means that implicit in the intelligibility of immediate
interaction are the obligations incumbent in Kantian legal theory on free
beings under moral laws.
Distributive justice also presupposes moral personality. We have al-
ready seen that distributive justice postulates a distinction, explicable in
Kantian terms, between persons and things. This distinction can be re-
lated to the abstractness of moral personality in the following way. Al-
though particular distributions connect the subject matter of the distribu-
tion to the recipients of it, and are therefore not abstract, distributive
justice as an ordering concept specifies no particular subject matter. A
particular distribution concretizes the person by bestowing an entitlement
to a particular benefit or an incumbency to a particular burden. Accord-
ingly, the concreteness of personhood in a distribution is a consequence,
not a presupposition, of that distribution. In particular distributions the
person must be conceived as concretely attached to a share in the thing
being distributed. Distributive justice, however, is the form underlying all
possible distributions; in itself it is neutral to any particular ones. There-
fore it presupposes abstract moral personality no less than does corrective
justice.
Both corrective and distributive justice incorporate the normativity of
externally interacting Kantian moral persons, but they express this
normativity through distinct structures of quantitative and proportional
PHIL. 515, 525 (1980). It could also be termed (and its connection to my theme would be clearer if it
were) "juridical personality," not only because this conception of the person is presupposed in juridi-
cal relationships, but also because law is the most primitive actualization of the freedom that exists in
its potential state in the person so conceived. See Weinrib, supra note 4, at 481-85, 501-03.
Of the two capacities that mark moral personality for Rawls, only the first, the capacity for a
conception of the good, is involved here. As for the second (the capacity for a sense of justice), the
coercion of law, in the Kantian view which distinguishes justice from virtue, is grounded precisely on
the conceptual irrelevance of any person's having or not having this sense. See I. KANT, supra note
14, at 76. Even for Rawls, the two capacities of the moral person are not parallel. See Rawls, The
Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND LAW 27-30 (S. McMurrin ed.
1987).
101. Rawls characterizes the original position as "the point of view from which noumenal selves
see the world." J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 255 (1971).
102. See I. KANT, supra note 14, at 35.
103. For a fuller treatment of the inherent normativity of the components of Kant's legal theory,
see Weinrib, supra note 4, at 485-87 (1987).
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equality. Hence the single normative presupposition that underlies imme-
diate and mediated interactions has two different manifestations in posi-
tive law. In corrective justice, the relationship between the interacting par-
ties is not mediated by the internal particularity of need or want. The
relationship cannot, therefore, be understood in terms of an obligation on
one to bestow a benefit on the other. What remain are the parties' recip-
rocal duties not to interfere wrongly with the embodiments (physical and
proprietary) of each other's moral personality, and the rights that are cor-
relative to these duties. The immediacy of their interaction yields in pri-
vate law a set of negative rights and duties that immediately appertain to
all interactors"0 4 Distributive justice, on the other hand, mediates the re-
lationship between persons through an extrinsic purpose determined by
political authority and establishes no duties immediately owed by person
to person. It operates on the mediation itself, requiring the exercise of
political authority to respect moral personality by conforming to the justif-
icatory structure immanent in all distributions. This normative constraint
on collective purposes expresses itself legally in the possibility of invalidat-
ing legislative and administrative action through judicial review.
Positive law reflects the immanent normativity of corrective and distrib-
utive justice through the retrospective operation of legal remedies. When a
court strikes down an administrative or legislative act or awards damages
to a private law litigant, its judgment does not merely state what the law
shall be from that moment on; it authoritatively defines the legal stan-
dards antecedently applicable to the very behavior at issue. This retros-
pectivity is problematic if the judgment is itself conceived as essentially
legislative, since such legislation would give the parties affected no chance
to guide their conduct by its prescriptions. The retrospectivity presumes
that the standard had moral force at the time of the action at issue in the
suit, and that the judgment is declaratory of this pre-existing moral force.
Inasmuch as the judgment is itself a specification of the meaning of cor-
rective or distributive justice in a particular context, the judgment's retro-
spective normativity presumably reflects the normativity that attaches at
once to the juridically intelligible nature of a transaction or a distribution.
The law assumes that the declared standard is notionally present to the
interaction in advance of its being declared, thus implicitly attesting that
the ordering of transactions and distributions through their respective
forms of justice is an inherently normative exercise. l05
104. See id. at 489.
105. Because the forms of justice are inherently normative, the elucidation of the adequacy of a
particular legal arrangement to one or the other of these is itself a normative argument. It therefore
makes no sense, for instance, after the demonstration of the way in which a given private law doctrine
conforms to corrective justice, to demand a separate enquiry into the normative basis of the private
law doctrine. Such a demand would be the equivalent of asking "What is the color of the color
green?" This fallacy has a distinguished intellectual history: Kant pointed out that Moses Mendels-
sohn's account of contractual obligation committed this very error. See 1. KANT, THE PHILosoPHY OF
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VI. CONCEPTUALISM AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
A. The Challenge to Conceptualism
So far I have set out a version of legal formalism that. construes juridi-
cal relationships in terms of the contrasting forms of corrective and dis-
tributive justice. Formalism, understood in this way, is avowedly and un-
abashedly conceptual in two respects. First, the components of form are
conspicuously manifested in the concepts through which a coherent legal
system is organized. Second, the forms are themselves the most abstract
concepts that bear upon the intelligibility of juridical relations. These two
points are related, in that the concepts of a coherent legal system are both
the expression and the means of discovering the most abstract concepts of
juridical coherence.'
At the heart of this conceptualism is the difference between the form of
corrective justice and the form of distributive justice. Just as these two
forms are the most abstract concepts underlying juridical relationships, so
the difference between these forms is itself a conceptual one. The two
forms of justice and the difference between them, although they are mani-
fested in sophisticated legal systems that are socially and historically con-
ditioned, are not themselves socially and historically conditioned. As pat-
terns of intelligibility latent in the justification of all interactions regarded
as external, they are not restricted to any particular episode of such inter-
action or to any particular set of such episodes. Their conceptual status
guarantees for them a significance that embraces external interaction
whenever and wherever it occurs and that, accordingly, transcends society
and historicity. As the categorically distinct abstractions underlying the
particularity of external interaction, corrective and distributive justice are
the stable substrata of intelligibility that persist through all the multifari-
ous juridical relationships that realize them. In other words, the forms of
justice are universals.
The current disfavor of formalism involves a rejection of such an essen-
tially conceptual understanding of law. The contemporary assumption is
that formalism is a necropolis of lifeless abstractions that repel meaningful
contact with the movement and vitality of social life. Formalist conceptu-
LAw 103-04 (W. Hastie trans. 1887); Benson, External Freedom According to Kant, 87 COLuM. L.
REV. 559 (1987).
106. We discover the concept of corrective justice, for instance, by reflecting on the legal institu-
tions we have and on the forms of order they presuppose. We see that particular legal holdings fit into
a certain conceptual framework that makes salient the apparently fixed points of legal reasoning in a
sophisticated legal culture (e.g., that a finding of negligence grows out of an adjudicated conglomerate
of cause, standard of care, and causation). We can then examine the presuppositions about interaction
evidenced in the components of this framework, all the while preserving the tendency toward coher-
ence that characterizes both thought in general and sophisticated legal systems in particular. This
process of regression on the conditions of private law leads to the category of corrective justice, which
is, so to speak, the arch-concept in terms of which all other private law concepts must be conceptual-
ized if they are to be coherent. And to see the forms of justice as presupposed in the concepts of a
sophisticated legal system is also to see those concepts as expressive of the applicable form.
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alism is thought to be incapable of comprehending the concrete legal real-
ity that it wishes to illuminate. This assessment, however, is perhaps the
most unfortunate consequence of the estrangement of contemporary legal
thought from the tradition on which legal formalism draws.107 In fact,
formalism does not fall foul of the defect for which it is so routinely con-
demned. That, at least, is the theme of my argument in this Part.
The charge against formalism amounts to an accusation that it holds
itself out to be a kind of moral geometry. These concepts are alleged to
exist in a world of their own-they are, in Holmes' famous phrase, "a
brooding omnipresence in the sky"' 0 8-and that world is categorically
separate from the world of human activity. Formalism is dismissed as "the
dogma that legal forms can be understood apart from their social con-
text."' 09 Further, critics claim, parallel to formalism's separation of con-
cepts from social context is its separation of the self from connection with
others. The Kantian notion of moral personality is said to ignore the way
community is constitutive of the individual. 0 Thus the conceptual ab-
stractness of formalism is equated by its critics with a withdrawal from
social and historical situatedness.
This conception of formalism's separation from the world is matched by
a conception of the way it impinges on the world. The formalist is alleged
to construe legal analysis as the geometrical working out of the logical
conclusions of a limited number of axioms. Its procedures are said to be
deductive, and hence to ignore the inevitable indeterminacy inherent in the
application of legal rules. Such indeterminacy purportedly can only be
handled by reference to the political."'
These charges touch many profound issues: the relationship between
the way law is and the theory of law; between the abstract and the con-
crete; between the universal and the particular. I wish to outline the mis-
conceptions on which such criticism rests. My basic point is that this criti-
cism does not take seriously the immanence of formal intelligibility.
107. Compare the following response to the parallel criticism of Spinoza:
Spinoza's method of exposition of his philosophical principles is particularly open to criticism
in that he seems to begin from an abstract concept of being, which makes impossible his ever
reaching the concrete reality whose nature and action it is his purpose to disclose. But what he
wants to affirm is a reality that is not indeterminate but fully determinate and therefore the
determinant of all lesser or derivative forms of existence. Such reality is not the negation of all
characters and relations but their totality or correlation.
Forsyth, Spinoza's Doctrine of God in Relation to His Conception of Causality, in STUDIES IN SPI-
NOZA 4 (S. Kashap ed. 1972).
108. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916).
109. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 68 (1984).
110. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Sandel, The Proce-
dural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984).
111. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 14; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983).
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B. The Detachment Issue
In the formalism I have been describing, the forms of justice do not
inhabit a world detached from the juridical relationships they govern.
They are not to be conceived as having an existence parallel to, but sepa-
rate from, the existence of human interaction. The forms of justice go to
the immanent coherence of juridical relationships. The formalism of these
forms does not lie in their existing somewhere apart from the social world,
but in their representing the different ways in which the juridical rela-
tionships of that world can be coherent." 2 Because they render interaction
intelligible from within, they presuppose interaction and cannot be eluci-
dated without it.
This point can also be made by reference to the concept of moral per-
sonality, which abstracts from particularity without dismissing it. One
might think that, strictly speaking, moral persons as such cannot interact.
The purposiveness characteristic of moral personality is a mere potential-
ity that, so long as it remains potential, does not issue into the world and
therefore does not act upon or interact with anything or anyone. In ab-
stracting from all particularity, moral personality, it might be said, with-
draws from the world and cannot leave its mark upon it. Only through
the realization of specific purposes does purposiveness radiate out from
the actor and reach his surroundings: The faculty of will impinges upon
others only insofar as it wills something. All this is true so far as it goes.
But far from undermining the significance of moral personality, this
merely indicates how moral personality wins its way into the concreteness
of interaction. Indeed, it confirms the essentiality of moral personality to
freely purposive beings by acknowledging that the rich variety of specific
purposes is but the actualization of the potentiality of purposiveness. The
will, to be a will, must will something. The particularity of what it wills,
however, does not confirm its status as a will; it merely completes its oper-
ation. From the standpoint of the forms of justice, purposiveness must
issue into a particular purpose but into no purpose in particular. These
forms, then, do not deny particularity; they treat it as a universal. They
acknowledge that my purposiveness is complete only in this purpose; the
content of the purpose, however, does not matter for them, because the
"thisness" of this purpose refers to any and every purpose.11 3
Inasmuch as they admit the particularity of interaction, the forms of
justice differ from the forms of geometry. The relationship of corrective
112. The forms of justice are not forms in the Platonic sense, supposed to exist in a peculiar
world of their own "on the other side of being." See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 195-99 (R. Sterling &
W. Scott trans. 1985) (on the form of the good). But see H. GADAMER, THE IDEA OF THE GOOD IN
PLATONIC-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY 27-31 (P. Smith trans. 1986) (Plato did not conceive of form
of good as a trans-existent entity, but as the unity of what is unitary, i.e., as what is presupposed by
anything ordered, enduring, and consistent).
113. See G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 62 para. 102 (A. Miller trans. 1977).
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and distributive justice to the transactions and the distributions that they
respectively govern is not that of a triangle in Euclidian geometry to a
triangle drawn on the blackboard. Whereas the geometer's triangle is
completely intelligible apart from the blackboard representation-indeed
the drawn triangle is always and necessarily a defective version of the idea
that it supposedly renders-the forms of justice cannot be understood de-
tached from the particularity of the external interactions that they govern
and from the specific regimes of positive law that actualize them. As the
ordering principles of interaction that become concrete in positive law,
corrective and distributive justice are the structures of coherent meaning
implicit in sophisticated legal systems.
The forms of justice are aspects of a mutually reinforcing movement
between legal content and juridical form. The form, being the form of the
content, does not exist separately from legal content. Indeed the notion of
form, taken in itself and divorced from all inkling of what this form might
be the form of, could never constitute a mode of intelligibility for any-
thing. For a form that is not implicit in a determinate content whose form
it is would be an abstraction from everything and thus, in itself, an abso-
lute nullity. Even if we see corrective and distributive justice in terms of
their different notions of equality, we must see these notions as devices
that model different justificatory structures and that therefore refer to
phenomena to which justificatory structures are pertinent. Otherwise the
forms of justice would represent not modes of ordering interaction but
merely the mathematical difference between a quantity and a proportion.
This is why we first come to an appreciation of the forms of juridical
relationship by working back from the content of legal systems that attach
a value to coherence. This procedure ensures that the elucidation of form
takes place in the context of a content whose forms they are.
The forms of justice are immanent and do not operate in detachment
from society or from history. Their significance as forms is understood
through the relationships they inform. These relationships are necessarily
social and historical ones. They are social in that they feature the interac-
tion of one person with another and thereby do not construe the person as
living isolated on a desert island. They are historical in that they are the
products of events in history, since these relationships come into being and
fade away in a world of temporality, flux, and change.114
114. A historicist critic of formalism might object that the formalist's pointing to the historical
situatedness of juridical relations is beside the point because the real difficulty is with the historical
intelligibility of those relations. The formalist postulates that though the forms govern historically
situated relationships, the forms themselves are not qua abstractions historically situated. These forms
are the ahistorical residue that is exposed to the historicist objection.
It is noteworthy, however, that contemporary critics of formalism do not always press their attacks
so far. Even while proclaiming their historicism they recognize that the indeterminacies that reflect
particular historical circumstances are embedded in an ahistorical framework of understanding. For
example, Robert Gordon's justly celebrated account of historicism in legal scholarship begins with the
statement that "law exists and must to some extent always be understood by reference to particular
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Juridical relationships, as comprehended by the formalist, not only take
place in society, but have a public meaning. The formalist is concerned
with the intelligibility of interactions in which the interacting parties are
treated as external to one another." 5 The externality of interaction must
be understood from a standpoint that is common to the parties to the in-
teraction."' Accordingly, interpreting the interaction requires recourse to
a shared public meaning. The forms of justice, as they apply to any spe-
cific juridical relationship, must draw upon this public meaning. Indeed,
the justificatory structures themselves participate in this public realm,
since justification with respect to external relationships involves the nega-
tion of purely private significances in favor of meanings that are accessible
to all and that can be openly vindicated in the presence of all.
The external character of juridical relationships also means that the
determination of the legal significance of a particular interaction must re-
side in an authority outside the parties. Formalism is not satisfied merely
by the correct elucidation of the adequacy of legal content to juridical
form. In addition, an impartial and disinterested authority must be availa-
ble who is recognized as expressing the public meaning of the interaction.
In other words, for the forms of justice to be applied, the public signifi-
cance of particular interactions must be expressible through mechanisms
of positive law." 7
In our legal culture, this function is performed by the judiciary. In de-
termining whether a transaction or a distribution has lived up to its order-
ing form, the court declares the meaning of corrective or distributive jus-
contexts of space and time. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981)
(emphasis added); see also id. note 1. Gordon appears to regard this statement about law's contextual
existence as antithetical to the attempt-which he stigmatizes as "rationalizing the real"-to show
that "the law-making and law-applying activities that go on in our society make sense and may be
rationally related to some coherent conceptual ordering scheme." Id. at 1018. However, Gordon's
qualification of his thesis by the words "to some extent" indicates that he does not believe that law can
exhaustively be understood by reference to particular contexts of space and time. His formulation
implies that a residue of intelligibility survives all the particularity of historical context.
Perhaps there is good reason for such historicist self-abnegation. The attack on the ahistorical na-
ture of formalist concepts would presumably have to be grounded in the assertion that all cognition is
historically conditioned. But this would imply, paradoxically, that the assertion is itself historically
conditioned. Some historicists indeed grasp this nettle boldly, if uncomfortably. See, e.g., M. Fou-
CAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 205 (A. Smith trans. 1972). For a discussion of the
difficulties, see D. CARR, PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY 237-59 (1974). The
historicist may want to claim for his own assertions an immunity from historicism, but if so the
question why the immunity extends only so far and does not include the formalist concepts remains
unanswered. In this unravelling of historicism, the possibility that law "may be rationally related to
some coherent conceptual ordering scheme" (in Gordon's words) cannot be categorically excluded. For
this reason, the case for formalism has to be examined on its own merits, not on the basis of historicist
preconceptions.
115. Their relationships are, therefore, not construed from a standpoint internal to the person by
reference to virtues of character or private sentiments, however laudable, such as the loving identifica-
tion by one person of the good of another with his or her own good. See supra note 58.
116. See T. AQUINAS, supra note 76, 11-I, Q. 60, Art. 1, 3.
117. For a more extended treatment from a Kantian standpoint of the theme of externality sum-
marized in the last two paragraphs, see Weinrib, supra note 4, at 491-500.
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tice in the context of the specific controversy at hand. It examines the
particular transaction or distribution against the background of public un-
derstandings through which corrective and distributive justice can be ex-
pressed, and its judgment provides the publicly authoritative interpreta-
tion of how the appropriate form of justice is applied to the controversy at
hand. This function is public, but it is not political. The court elucidates
the public meaning of the transaction or the distribution at issue; it does
not orient the juridical relationship to any extrinsic purpose.
One can, therefore, distinguish two public functions-one political, the
other juridical-that formalism ascribes to the positivity of law. The first
is the selection of the goal to be embodied in a particular distribution and
thereby to be authoritatively inscribed into the schedule of the commu-
nity's collective purposes.' I The setting up of a particular distribution is
an act of political authority that clothes its determinations with the attrib-
utes of positive law. Although the particular distribution must, if it is to
actualize an intelligible order, conform to distributive justice, it embodies
an extrinsic-and therefore political-purpose. The second function is ju-
ridical: to interpret particular transactions and distributions in accordance
with the form of justice they instantiate. This function does not depend on
a standpoint outside the forms of justice. Rather, it requires courts to
specify, in a publicly authoritative way, the meaning of these forms in the
context of particular interactions.
A recent case illustrates the distinction between these two functions. In
Lamb v. London Borough of Camden,"9 the English Court of Appeal
was confronted with a problem of proximate cause. The plaintiff home-
owner was suing the defendant municipality for the damage resulting
from the negligent repair of a sewer pipe. Contractors employed by the
defendant had breached a water main and the resulting flood caused the
plaintiff's house to subside. Because the house was then unsafe, the plain-
tiff used it only for storage as it awaited repair. While the house remained
vacant squatters moved in. Subsequently, they were evicted, and the plain-
tiff boarded up the house. Nevertheless squatters moved in again, and this
time damaged the house's interior. The question for the court was
whether the municipality was liable for the damage done by the second set
of squatters.
This case is typical of situations where several causes, including the
actions of third parties, intervene between the plaintiff's damage and the
tortfeasor's original negligence."20 Given the number and variety of possi-
ble causes, courts have never been able-and doubtless never will be
118. This function calls for a political body that is recognized as the locus of collective decision-
making, that can evaluate the full range of possible distributions, and that is accountable to the com-
munity as a whole for the particular ones that it selects.
119. 2 All E.R. 408 (C.A.) (1981).
120. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 44, at 301-19 (5th ed. 1984).
19881 1005
The Yale Law Journal
able-to come up with a definitive verbal formula for resolving these dis-
putes. Confronted with this indeterminacy the members of the court took
two different approaches. Lord Denning, declaring it "a question of policy
for judges to decide," '121 thought the decisive consideration was that dam-
age to property, including damage caused by criminal acts, is usually cov-
ered by the owner's insurance, and that the insurers whose business it is
to cover the risk should not be allowed by subrogation to pass the cost on
to the defendant. Through insurance "the risk of loss is spread throughout
the community. It does not fall too heavily on one pair of shoulders
alone." '122 He accordingly ruled against liability.
In concurrence with Lord Denning in this result, Lord Justice Watkins
made no reference to insurance or to loss-spreading. Instead, he drew at-
tention to what is suggested by "the very features" of the act or event for
which damages are claimed. This included such matters as the nature of
the event, the time and place of its occurrence, the identity and intentions
of the perpetrator, and the responsibility for taking measures to avoid the
occurrence.12 These factors did not produce anything that could be a uni-
versal test, but Lord Justice Watkins found that they yielded "the instinc-
tive feeling" that the squatters' damage was too remote for the defendant's
liability. 24
Both Lord Denning and Lord Justice Watkins issued public and au-
thoritative declarations of positive law. There is, however, this difference
between them. Lord Denning's approach was essentially political. It first
required selecting the particular goal of loss-spreading from among the
various goals (including general deterrence, specific deterrence and redis-
tribution to the deepest pocket125) that his judgment might promote. It
then necessitated electing to effect this goal through the homeowner's
property insurance, not through the tortfeasor's liability insurance or
through the municipality's self-insurance. Loss-spreading, however, like
all external goals, is a matter for distributive justice and cannot be coher-
ently achieved within the relationship of doer and sufferer. Nor is its pos-
iting the province of a judge, who is neither in a position to canvass the
range of possible collective goals, nor accountable to the community for
the particular goal chosen.
Lord Justice Watkins, in contrast, does not attempt to achieve any goal
external to the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. His judgment
is an exposition of the nature of that relationship through attention to the
link between the defendant's wrongdoing and the plaintiff's damage. For
him proximate cause is not an occasion for "policy," but is a juridical
121. Lamb, 2 All E.R. at 414.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 421.
124. Id.
125. G. CALABRES1, supra note 18.
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concept under which the court comprehends the nexus between the liti-
gants by tracing the proximity of the wrongful act to the injurious effect.
This concept does not have an existence independent of the interaction to
which it is applied, and its features cannot be listed and weighted in a
formula that yields a uniquely determinate conclusion. This explains Lord
Justice Watkins' reference to intuition. The meaning of proximate cause
in this situation is not a result of matching these facts to an independently
conclusive formula; it is simply the most plausible construal of the rela-
tionship between the parties in light of the factors that are deemed rele-
vant. For these facts, the conclusion constitutes the meaning of the concept
they instantiate.
In concentrating on the features of the injurious act rather than on a
mediating goal, Lord Justice Watkins treats proximate cause as a concept
that bears on the immediate intelligibility of the parties' relationship.
Proximate cause so treated is one of the set of concepts through which a
delictual interaction is understandable as corrective justice. Because cor-
rective justice is conceived as immanent to the transactions that it regu-
lates, its operation is not intelligible independently of those transactions.
The actualization of corrective justice through judicial decisions "is not
the subsequent applying to a concrete case of a given universal that we
understand first by itself, but it is the actual understanding of the univer-
sal itself that the given text constitutes for us."1 ' The particular transac-
tions and their intelligibility as corrective justice can be interpreted only
126. H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 305 (1975). Gadamer speaks of "[tihe meaning of
application that is involved in all forms of understanding. . . ." Id. Although Gadamer considers
legal interpretation to be paradigmatic of the hermeneutical approach to the relationship between the
universal and the particular, he does not understand legal universals in terms of the formalist concep-
tions presented in this essay. His exposition of legal interpretation takes the form of a commentary on
Aristotle's notion of equity. See id. at 278-89. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle asserts that equity is:
a corrective of what is legally just. The reason is that all law is universal, but there are some
things about which it is not possible to speak correctly in universal terms . . . .So in a situa-
tion in which the law speaks universally, but the case at issue happens to fall outside the
universal formula, it is correct to rectify the shortcoming, in other words, the omission and
mistake of the lawgiver due to the generality of his statement.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 141.
Gadamer does not relate this passage to Aristotle's discussion of the forms of justice which precedes
it by several pages. There is, however, no tension between these passages. Under the rubric of equity,
Aristotle analyzes a perennially difficult issue concerning positive law, when the forms of justice are
made concrete through definitive statements of legal authorities. For Aristotle's discussion, it is these
statements that attract the problem of infelicitous generalization, not the forms themselves.
Gadamer conceives of the universal not in terms of stable conceptual patterns (such as corrective
and distributive justice), but-as Richard Bernstein summarizes his view-in terms of "those princi-
ples, norms, and laws that are founded in the life of a community and orient our particular decisions
and actions." R. BERNSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES 71 (1986). However, as Lord Justice Wat-
kins' opinion in Lamb indicates, the significance of application is no different for the formalist's
universals than it is for Gadamer's. The deep issue raised by the difference between Gadamer and the
formalist is the following. Gadamer, as a representative of modernity, is situated between the "post-
moderns" who postulate the utter contingency of social practices, see id. at 83-88, and the "pre-
modern" conceptualists who claim that social practices can be understood through form. Is there room
for such comfortable middle ground, or is his position intelligible only as a deformation of one or the
other of the two extremes?
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from within a public realm of shared social meanings that judicial deci-
sion renders legally authoritative. The same process holds for the applica-
tion to a particular distribution of the components of personhood and
equality that are internal to distributive justice. This drawing out of the
significance of the forms of justice for particular transactions and distribu-
tions is the juridical function of positive law. It is categorically different
from the political role of determining the exogenous end that is to be em-
bodied in a distribution.
C. The Determinacy Issue
These remarks about the immanence of the forms of justice, and the
consequent denial of the claim that they have a socially detached exis-
tence, also bear on the relevance of indeterminacy. As this account of Lord
Justice Watkins' judgment in the Lamb case illustrates, formalism does
not rely on the antecedent determinacy for particular cases of the concepts
entrenched in positive law, even when those concepts reflect the appropri-
ate form of justice. In Lamb, and cases like it, the organ of positive law
has the function of determining an antecedently indeterminate contro-
versy. For formalism the crucial distinction is between the juridical, which
is comprised of whatever expresses the internal coherence of the forms of
justice, and the political, which is the domain of the collective goals extrin-
sic to those forms. Nothing about formalism precludes indeterminacy, as
the critics understand it, within the juridical operation of either of the
forms of justice. Formalism merely insists that such indeterminacy not be
seen-as it was by Lord Denning in Lamb-as a reason for transforming
a juridical exercise into a political one.
For formalism the possibility of indeterminacy neither can, nor need be,
avoided. Indeterminacy follows from formalism's conception of the rela-
tionship between general and particular. Legal formalism deals with the
particulars of external interaction by abstracting from them to a coherent
set of juridical categories, and ultimately by abstracting further to correc-
tive and distributive justice as the two concepts of juridical coherence.
This approach to the intelligibility of the law's content aims at an illumi-
nation of the particular through the general: The particulars are the inex-
haustible ways in which persons can externally affect one another,
whereas the forms are the general patterns through which these particu-
lars are understood as juridically coherent. The forms of justice, as the
most abstract representations of a conceptual distinction within the struc-
ture of justification, are philosophical constructs that are not themselves
variable. In contrast, the particulars of one person's impingement on an-
other are unavoidably contingent. This difference between the enduring
generality of the forms and the contingency of the particulars is precisely
what, for the formalist, allows the former to be principles of ordering for
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the latter. It also prevents the law's treatment of all the possible particu-
lars from being exhaustively specifiable by theory: Such exhaustiveness
would mean that the particulars are theoretically as intelligible as the
forms through which they are understood, and would render otiose the
formalist's invocation of form. The predetermination of a uniquely correct
result for every legal controversy, as the critics demand, would make for-
malism self-stultifying.
The critics deploy the charge of indeterminacy with respect to the re-
sults of particular legal controversies, and claim that for any case-or at
least for any difficult cased-no uniquely correct solution is available in
advance. As directed against formalism, however, this criticism bites on
air. Formalism does not require the determinacy of every particular case.
The distinctive feature of formalism is that it denies the primacy of the
particular by claiming that particulars are intelligible only through con-
ceptual categories. Particulars, considered directly on their own as partic-
ulars, are regarded as unknowable. They can become objects of cognition
only when their essential characteristics can be grasped as a unity that is
classifiable with other unities of the same sort and distinguishable from
unities of a different sort. For law this means that juridical relationships
can be understood only through the nexus of concepts through which they
attain their distinctive inner coherence as expressions of corrective or dis-
tributive justice. When these comprehensive abstractions are brought onto
the stage, determinacy cannot be a matter of the uniquely correct solution
to any particular case, since the particularity of interaction has an aspect
of contingency with respect to the concepts under which it falls. A func-
tion of positive law is to resolve such unavoidable indeterminacy for par-
ticular cases. 127
In another sense, however, formalist concepts do determine their partic-
ulars. To determine something is to set the boundaries that mark it off
from something else. A concept can be determinative even though it does
not exhaustively predetermine the particulars under it, if it intelligibly
performs the determining function of marking something off from some-
thing else in a way appropriate to concepts. Corrective and distributive
justice are determinative in the sense that they demarcate juridical rela-
tionships as ensembles of coherent justificatory significance. Form goes to
the character, unity, and genericity of what it informs. The forms of jus-
tice determine juridical relationships by representing the justificatory
structures through which those relationships can be understood as the
sorts of thing that they are and to which they must conform if they are to
127. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 132, 1135a, 5-10 (while there are many specific acts, in
each case only the universal is just); G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 14, at 137
(the concept merely lays down a general limit within which there is place for contingent decisions of
positive law).
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be intelligible. The forms of justice are thus determinative as the distinc-
tive-not the exhaustive-modes for the understanding of law. 28
These abstract forms determine juridical relationships in several ways.
First, they set out the different structures of justification that legal phe-
nomena can express and thus mark the boundaries within which coherent
justifications subsist. Corrective justice and distributive justice are categor-
ically distinct; as a result any given juridical relationship must maintain
itself within the confines of its appropriate framework. Second, these two
forms of justice are the most inclusive abstractions of juridical coherence;
their conceptual components demarcate the limits of the juridical as op-
posed to the political. Third, the forms exhibit the different ways in which
relations among persons can be understood as external; thus they demar-
cate a normativity that is distinguishable from the moral excellences, such
as love and virtue, that are internal to the agent. Accordingly, the forms of
justice are determinative in that they make salient the boundaries of jurid-
ical intelligibility. In light of these forms juridical relationships cannot be
understood as a confusion either of the corrective and the distributive, or
of the juridical and the political, or of the external and the internal. Since
juridical relationships are formally determinable in these ways, legal phe-
nomena are more than an indeterminate aggregate of particulars.
Determinacy, therefore, can refer both to the particularity of specific
holdings and to the general abstractions under which they fall. In accor-
dance with the meanings respectively appropriate to each, the particular
and the general can be said to be mutually codetermining. The forms of
justice determine particular holdings by supplying the structure immanent
to the justification of those particular holdings. For any such holding the
forms determine the kind of holding it is by representing the pattern of
coherence that is exemplified in the reasoning that supports it. Conversely,
the particular holding enunciated in positive law determines the form by
exhibiting the particular shape that the form manifests in a particular
social and historical context. The form marks out the conceptual generic-
ity of the particular holding, and the holding marks out the contextual
specificity of the form. Thus the form and the holding are locked in an
embrace of reciprocal determination.
Both sides of this process are necessary for the understanding of a jurid-
ical relationship. A particular determination that is not adequate to any
form of justice cannot be grasped as a coherent ordering of external inter-
action. Similarly, a form that is conceived independently of application to
particular interactions is not a form that is immanent to the intelligibility
of a legal content. On the one hand, a particular holding is intelligible
only inasmuch as it instantiates a form of justice. Although, as Lamb il-
lustrates, abstract concepts cannot predetermine the uniquely correct solu-
128. Cf. Radbruch, supra note 75, at 75 (justice is principle specific to law, not exhaustive of it).
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tion to every particular case, the character of the reasoning underlying a
given judgment is limited to-and therefore determined by-what is per-
missible within the appropriate structure of justification. On the other
hand, formalism requires that controversy about particular interaction be
determinable through the distillation of social understandings in positive
law, for otherwise the interaction could not achieve the full measure of
external intelligibility toward which the forms of justice point.
Moreover, since the forms of justice are discovered by regression from
the conceptual structure of a sophisticated legal system, they incorporate
the recognition that in such systems of the inevitable insufficiency of con-
cepts to predetermine the results of all the cases to which they might be
applied. This recognition is institutionalized in the common law, for in-
stance, in the allocation to the jury of deliberation, pursuant to the judge's
instructions, regarding mixed questions of law and fact. Under this ar-
rangement, the jury applies standards that are themselves specifications of
more general legal categories, but the particularity of the jury function
means that the force of its finding is restricted to the case at hand and
lacks precedential status. Correspondingly, the conceptual nature of the
forms of justice determines not the specificity of these decisions but the
coherence of the ensemble of concepts on which the judge draws in formu-
lating the relevant instruction.
Determinacy relates in different ways to the generality of the forms and
to the particularity of external interaction. Formalism comprehends both
these ways in their interrelation. The forms of justice are both determi-
nate and indeterminate. They are indeterminate in that they do not prede-
termine exhaustively the particular results they govern. They are determi-
nate in that they establish the bounds of coherence for the particulars that
fall under them, thus making these particulars intelligible as the sorts of
things that they are. In determining character, unity, and genericity for
juridical relationships, the forms of justice determine all that they need to,
or can, determine as forms.
As an ordering immanent to the intelligibility of external interaction,
the forms of justice necessarily make contact with a social and historical
world because they must be specified for particular cases. These specifica-
tions depend on the public meanings of such a world. Within the bounds
of character, unity, and genericity, the forms are constituted by the shared
understandings of society, and the forms' particular public shapes are au-
thoritatively declared by the functionaries of positive law. Thus, although
the forms as such, because they are conceptually distinguishable, have an
ahistorical universality, their manifestations in a legal system are relative
to a set of public meanings that obtain at a given time and place. In its
governance of juridical relationships, formalism is universality with a va-
riable content.
This variability has been recognized by formalists almost since the be-
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ginning. In his famous discussion of the relationship between what is just
by nature and what is just by convention, Aristotle commented that
"among us [as contrasted with what holds for gods] there are things
which, though naturally just, are nevertheless changeable .. ."" This
sentence can now be interpreted as including the following understanding.
The intelligibility of juridical relationships is not merely a conventional
opinion, because corrective and distributive justice are the perduring jus-
tificatory structures through which the coherence of such relationships can
be conceived. The way in which the forms of justice are realized in legal
systems is, however, subject to the variations inherent in their public in-
terpretation and application. Thus, the forms of justice coexist with inde-
terminacies whose resolution can vary from time to time and from culture
to culture.
The version of formalism that I have been presenting is neither positiv-
ist nor historicist. Legal positivism and historicism construe the law's posi-
tivity and its history respectively as the exhaustive modes of understanding
it. Formalism is not positivist, because corrective and distributive justice
are conceptual categories that inform the content of law without them-
selves being posited by legal authority. It is not historicist because the
forms of justice are not bound to a particular social and temporal context.
But although formalism transcends positivity and history, it is not uncon-
nected to them. Because formalism inquires into the intelligibility imma-
nent to juridical relations, the object of its attention is the historical do-
main of social interaction and the public announcements by positive law
of the terms of that interaction. In comprehending the social and historical
arrangements established by positive law as the possible expressions of a
coherent order, formalism does not ignore the history, positivity, and social
reality of law. Rather, formalism claims to be their truth.
VII. FORMALISM AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
My argument has been that the juridical, understood as the immanent
intelligibility of the treatment of external interactions in a coherent legal
system, is conceptually distinct from extrinsic political purpose. This ar-
gument has several steps. (i) Form is the integration of character, generic-
ity, and unity that renders a determinate content intelligible. (ii) The con-
tent of a sophisticated legal system is intelligible from within. (iii) The
presentation of legal intelligibility as the interpenetration of form and con-
tent stakes out a vantage point internal to law. (iv) Law authoritatively
orders the external relations between persons, and justice is the intelligi-
bility of this ordering. (v) The intelligibility of law therefore involves the
disclosure of the relationship between the law's content and the forms of
129. ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 131.
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justice that constitute the most inclusive justificatory structures applicable
to external relations. (vi) Two different forms of justice can be discerned.
Corrective justice constitutes the internal rationality of transactions. Dis-
tributive justice, which mediates the relations among persons, and between
persons and things, according to some criterion, is the internal rationality
of distributions. (vii) These two forms exhibit differing structures and are
not reducible one to the other. (viii) Justifications that blend the compo-
nents of these two different forms are necessarily incoherent. (ix) Only
distributions are amenable to the extrinsic-and thus instrumen-
tal-operation of political purpose. (x) The juridical consists of the eluci-
dation and specification, in the context of particular transactions and dis-
tributions, of a content that is adequate to the justificatory structures of
these two forms. (xi) The two forms of justice have inherent normative
force because they presuppose the Kantian notion of moral personality.
(xii) The forms of justice, being immanent to the understanding of exter-
nal interaction, are not divorced from the social and historical world. (xiii)
They determine the juridical character, genericity and coherence of that
world through the positive law that is their existence at the level of partic-
ular transactions and distributions.
This understanding of law makes salient the venerable notion of form.
Legal formalism is the approach that tracks the implications of form
through the doctrines, institutions, and conceptual structure of a sophisti-
cated legal system. For such a system its own coherence is a regulative
idea. Its determinations are not unconnected bits of particularity but draw
their vitality from their participation in a community of concepts and jus-
tifications. The forms of justice represent these justifications at their most
abstract and inclusive. Inasmuch as law is the ordering of external inter-
action, corrective and distributive justice provide the fundamental unities
that inform such interaction.
Formalism stands for the possibility that the elaboration of law can be a
coherent enterprise in justification. The formalist construes the doctrines,
institutions and concepts of a sophisticated legal system as embodying the
intelligible structures of external interaction and therefore as expressing in
positive law the forms through which juridical coherence can be achieved.
These forms are implicit in the content of law. The juridical function of
legal ordering is to make transactions and distributions conform to their
own latent unity. Correspondingly, the function of legal philosophy is to
make these forms explicit as the justificatory structures through which the
law's immanent intelligibility is grasped.
In relating law to the most abstract forms of interaction, formalism
presents an uncompromising version of law's internal coherence and of the
consequent possibility of distinguishing the juridical from the political. Its
extremism can be seen from the contrast with the currently dominant
modes of legal scholarship. Three approaches are particularly popular
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and significant: interpretation, economic analysis, and Critical Legal Stud-
ies. I wish to conclude with a criticism-suggestive rather than exhaus-
tive-of each of these approaches.
First, in contemporary writing the internal intelligibility of law is dealt
with under the rubric of interpretation."' The task of expounding the
law's internal dimension is said to be subject to whatever constraints are
felt to pervade any interpretive community or are inherent in the nature
of interpretation. The phenomenon of interpretation is invoked both be-
cause it is familiar to lawyers and because its operation in law can be
illuminated by reference to other intellectual domains, especially literary
ones. The reference to non-legal interpretive enterprises, however, merely
distances us from the task at hand. In the absence of an exposition of the
specifically juridical nature of interpretation as applied to law, the appeal
to the general phenomenon of interpretation is merely a restatement of the
problem that profitlessly enlarges its scope. For it implies that interpreta-
tion in literature is a more lucid exercise than interpretation in law, so
that the former can cast light on the latter. This ignores the possibil-
ity-prominent in hermeneutic writingl 3l-that law is itself exemplary
for the understanding of interpretation and that therefore one must grasp
the nature of legal interpretation before one can grasp the nature of inter-
pretation more generally. Legal formalism supplies the compass points for
the specifically juridical interpretation of interaction. From a perspective
internal to the law's content, formalism draws out the implications of a
sophisticated legal system's tendency to coherence by making explicit the
justificatory patterns to which the content of such a system must conform.
It thus carries the internal impetus of interpretation forward to its ulti-
mate degree.1"2
130. Influential examples of such scholarship are Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 739 (1982); R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 146-77.
131. See H. GADAMER, supra note 126, at 278; see also Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneuti-
cal and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 135 S. CAL. L. REV. 136, 150-51 (1985) (discussing whether
law or art should be treated as the paradigm of interpretation).
132. Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire is the most extensive attempt systematically to understand
the relationship between law and interpretation. Dworkin's work is an exploration of law from the
internal point of view. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 49. He characterizes interpretation as the
striving to make an object the best it can be. See id. at 53. Dworkin's thesis is that the internal point
of view necessitates, through interpretation, reference to "the best." Even if reference to "the best" is
required by the internal point of view, however, is Dworkin's conception of the best itself internal to
law? The matter can be put as follows: Is an interpretation best because it is internal or is it internal
because it is best? Although Dworkin does not, to my knowledge, explicitly raise this issue, the an-
swer he would give is crucial. If internality is controlling, Dworkin would be depending on an unar-
ticulated notion of form. If on the other hand, goodness is controlling, Dworkin's theory would not be
fully internal. Dworkin seems to want to have it both ways and to be simultaneously inside and
outside. He takes legal interpretation to have two dimensions, fit with legal doctrine and attractiveness
as an ideal of political morality, each of which influences the other. See id. at 231. While he does not
tell us whether the second dimension is internal or external, he constantly analyzes it independently of
the first, which seems unquestionably internal. Moreover, the ideal he proposes for the common law,
an egalitarianism of resources, is defended as being superior to its competitor because "it fits our legal
and moral practices no worse and is better in abstract moral theory." Id. at 301 (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). Since the determination of the second dimension is a matter of "abstract moral
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In economic analysis the striving of legal doctrine for economic effi-
ciency is what makes the law coherent. Economic efficiency, however, is a
deeply flawed vehicle for the coherence of law. First of all, although effi-
ciency is trumpeted as carrying the implicit logic of the common law,133 it
cannot account for the normative quality that attaches immediately to the
holdings of private law. 3 " Moreover, the hypothesis of the efficiency of
law deals only with the law's specific determinations and not with the
structure of thought internal to the law from which these determinations
emerge as conclusions or specifications. 135 Consequently economic analysis
treats legal results as understandable independent of their indigenous
framework of justification. In this way economic analysis is detached from
the most internally intelligible aspect of the law. Finally, efficiency is it-
self composed of a number of considerations-efficiency in incentives that
minimize the risk of undesirable outcomes, efficiency in insurance incen-
tives for bearing the risk, efficiency in the administration of legal
rulesS 6-that are not conceptually integrated and therefore exert compet-
ing pressures. Accordingly, in contrast to the notion of juridical form, the
goal of efficiency stands to law as something that is neither moral, nor
immanent, nor coherent.
Finally, the scholarship of Critical Legal Studies, provides the starkest
contrast to the view presented here. Critical Legal Studies denies that law
expresses or can express any notion of coherence, either immanent or ex-
trinsic. In the absence of comprehensive frameworks through which the
law can be understood, legal determination is dissolved into the particular-
ity of choice. Pretending otherwise merely disguises the oppression of
power under the specious vocabulary of right. We can do no more than
attend to the very bruteness of our choosings, all the while remaining con-
scious of the inevitably political nature of our collective decisions. To
sanctify some choices as legal rather than political is to indulge in the
vanity of myth.
theory," its moral power is what (providing it satisfies a threshold of fit) qualifies it for admission to
law. Perhaps his position can be summed up as follows: One understands law from the internal point
of view, i.e., from the understanding of interpretation that this point of view contains. Interpretation,
although itself an internal requirement, supplies the theorist with an import license to bring in "the
best." This license is a limited one in that what the theorist can import depends on the products
already circulating in the interpretive economy. The license is also limiting because the imports drive
some of the domestic products out of the interpretive market. If this understanding of Dworkin is
approximately correct, his view involves a jurisprudential renvoi, in which the internal notion of inter-
pretation triggers the admission of external elements of political morality. Thus, Dworkin's standpoint
is not as thoroughly internal as the formalist's.
133. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 17, at 21-22.
134. As the goal in an instrumentalist theory, efficiency does not attach immediately to private
law but is independently posited on the basis of its desirability. Efficiency is also not immediate
because it has no normative significance of its own and is at best a proxy for broader instrumentalist
considerations. See Weinrib, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 307
(1980).
135. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 17, at 21.
136. See M. POLINSKY, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (1983).
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Formalism asserts that this myth is true after all. For the formalist, the
salutary contribution of Critical Legal Studies is to show that once we
step outside the most rigorous notion of internal coherence, the slide to
nihilism is swift and easy. In this sense, Critical Legal Studies captures
the essence of contemporary scholarship by accentuating-and then ex-
ploding-its makeshift compromises. The significance of Critical Legal
Studies is that it forces us to confront anew the problem of coherence in
law. It raises the eternal question of legal philosophy, and presents us
with its own skeptical answer.
In claiming that that answer is wrong, formalism gives voice to the
most ancient aspirations of natural law theorizing by construing the law
as permeated by reason. The forms of justice represent the conceptual
structures applicable to the understanding of juridical phenomena, and the
content of law is intelligible to the extent that its justifications express
these structures. Because the forms are implicit in external interaction,
they are present in everyday life, are accessible to the workaday jurists
who take up the task of legal elaboration, and are reflected in whatever
coherence sophisticated legal cultures attain. In the formalist understand-
ing law is not the realization of a utopian project. It is, nonetheless, a
supreme achievement of mind.
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